Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Virtual Worlds by Fairfield, Joshua A. T.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 1 Article 12
2011
Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on
Contractual Control of Virtual Worlds
Joshua A. T. Fairfield
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Fairfield, Joshua A. T. (2011) "Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Virtual Worlds," William Mitchell Law




NEXUS CRYSTALS: CRYSTALLIZING LIMITS ON 
CONTRACTUAL CONTROL 
 OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 
Joshua A.T. Fairfield† 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 44 
 II. CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OF ONLINE COMMUNITIES ............. 50 
A. The Legal Background ........................................................ 50 
1. The Copyright Act’s Basic Limits on Contractual 
Control.......................................................................... 52 
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Anti-
Circumvention Right ..................................................... 55 
3. Contract Construction as a Limit on Copyright Control ... 57 
4. Communications Decency Act Section 230 and the 
Unenforceability of Consumer Protection Provisions by 
Consumers .................................................................... 58 
5. Overtones of Anticompetition .......................................... 61 
B. The Emerging Case Law ...................................................... 62 
1. Chamberlain v. Skylink .............................................. 64 
2. Lexmark v. Static Control Components .................... 65 
3. MGE UPS Systems v. GE Consumer & Industrial ..... 67 
 III. NEXUS CRYSTALS: CRYSTALLIZING LIMITS ON 
CONTRACTUAL CONTROLS ...................................................... 70 
A. MDY v. Blizzard Entertainment ....................................... 71 
1. The Players and Some Additional Interesting Facts .......... 71 
2. The District Court Opinions ........................................... 75 
B. The Ninth Circuit Appeal .................................................... 78 
1. Conditions, Covenants, and Copyrights .......................... 78 
2. Antitrust and Copyright Misuse ..................................... 84 
C. Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control ......................... 87 
 IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 94 
 
        † Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Frances 
Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University School of Law.  Many thanks to 
Ted Castronova and Greg Lastowka for ideas and suggestions.  Thanks to Kelley 
Bodell and Michael Bombace for research assistance.  All errors, opinions, and 
errors of opinion are mine. 
1
Fairfield: Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Vi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011




Can a video game developer or publisher successfully sue a 
video game player for copyright infringement for not “playing a 
game nicely,” “cheating,” or “buying software from a third party”?  
This article suggests a new reason why it cannot. 
The founding social contract of the new millennium is the End 
User License Agreement (EULA), not the U.S. Constitution.  
Website terms of use (TOU) and software EULAs now have an 
enormous impact on how citizens must act and how their rights 
and redresses are defined.  EULAs contain not only traditional 
intellectual property licensing conditions1 but complicated 
directives regarding what members of online communities can say, 
how they must act, what they can do, with whom they can transact 
business, and whether they can own the fruits of their own labor.2 
 The question that has been before academics for a long time, and 
before courts for a shorter time, is how far these contracts can go in 
controlling the property and dignitary interests of contractual 
 
 1. See Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_sib?ie=UT
F8&nodeId=200506200 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (“Upon your download of Digital 
Content and payment . . . [Amazon] grants you a non-exclusive right to view, use, 
and display such Digital Content an unlimited number of times, solely on the 
Kindle or a Reading Application or as otherwise permitted as part of the Service . . 
. . Digital Content is licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider.”). 
 2. See World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last updated Oct. 
29, 2010) [hereinafter World of Warcraft EULA] (“All title, ownership rights and 
intellectual property rights in and to the Game and all copies thereof (including 
without limitation any . . . characters . . . concepts, artwork, character inventories . 
. . and any related documentation) are owned or licensed by Blizzard.”).  In the 
World of Warcraft EULA, the ability to permanently transfer all rights and 
obligations under the EULA of the game is detailed.  Id. (explaining that a 
transfer is allowed so long as you transfer the physical copy with all the 
documentation that came with it, delete all copies on your computer and in your 
possession, and the transferee agrees to the EULA); see also, e.g., Second Life Terms of 
Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last updated Dec. 
15, 2010) [hereinafter Second Life EULA] (outlining the rights and responsibilities 
of Linden Lab and end users).  Specifically, section 4.5 of the Second Life EULA 
states that Linden Lab owns the Server data and is not liable for service 
interruptions or loss of data.  Id.  This is subject to section 7.1, which recognizes 
end users’ pre-existing intellectual property rights.  Id.  Section 6 specifies that 
“virtual land” is owned by Linden Lab and that it is licensed to the user.  Id. 
2
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communities.3  The consequences of this legal debate are 
immediate and personal,4 although the law governing these rules is 
always in flux and sometimes incoherent.  You may “jailbreak” your 
iPhone or “root” your droid5 without implicating copyright issues 
no matter what your license says.  But if you “mod” your PlayStation 
3 (PS3) in violation of your software license agreement (or, worse, 
show others how to do so), then you risk a major lawsuit.6 
 
 3. See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and 
Society on the Cyberian Frontier 4, 30 (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618, 2001), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828 
(discussing the lack of distinct protections for property rights in virtual property 
because of EULAs, despite the scale of virtual worlds); see also Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (detailing the novel issues 
presented by the relationship between the creator and user of a virtual world, as 
created by the Linden Lab’s EULA).  But see Will Knight, Gamer Wins Back Virtual 
Booty in Court Battle, NEWSCIENTIST (Dec. 23, 2003, 14:37), http:// 
www.newscientist.com/article/dn4510-gamer-wins-back-virtualbooty-in-court-
battle.html (discussing Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology Development Co., a 
case in which a Chinese court ordered a virtual-world company to return the 
virtual property to a player whose account had been hacked and looted). 
 4. See Knight, supra note 3; see also Dutch Court Rules Virtual Theft Is Real, 
RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (Oct. 22, 2008, 3:04 PM), http://www.rnw.nl 
/english/article/dutch-court-rules-virtual-theft-real (reporting a case from 
Germany in which two boys threatened a classmate with a knife until he agreed to 
transfer virtual items to their account in the online game, Runescape); Mike 
Musgrove, Tokyo Woman Jailed for Avatar “Murder,” WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2008,  
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2008/10/tokyo_woman_jailed_for_a
vatar.html?nav=rss_blog. 
 5. Rooting, or jailbreaking, is the process of installing an application on a 
phone that has not been approved by the phone’s manufacturer.  See Debra 
Littlejohn Shinder, Pros and Cons of Jailbreaking or Rooting Your Smartphone, 
TECHREPUBLIC SMARTPHONES (Aug. 20, 2010, 8:00 PM PDT), http:// 
www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/pros-and-cons-of-jailbreaking-or-
rooting-your-smartphone/1460.  While jailbraking is no longer illegal, the 
jailbraking exception of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) does not 
address the likely breach of contract between you and, for example, Apple, should 
you jailbreak your iPhone.  Id.  So, your warranty may be voided and Apple or 
Google can issue a patch to “fix” your jailbreaking or rooting.  Id.  Your phone can 
also be bricked.  Id.  This is where the smartphone basically locks up and either 
requires new hardware due to software corruption or complex repair (in effect, 
turning your cell phone into a $400 “brick”).  Id. 
 6. Compare Exemption to Prohibition Against Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. § 
201.40 (2010) [hereinafter Jailbreak Exemption] (creating the “jail-breaking” 
exception rule that does not force smartphone makers to permit jail-breaking but 
makes it lawful to circumvent controls designed to block jail-breaking), with 37 
C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(4) (2010) (providing an exception for video games where the 
circumvention is for good faith testing, investigating, or correcting of security 
issues provided the information from the testing is used in such a way that does 
not aid in copyright infringement), and Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz, 
No. CV11 0167, 2011 WL 347137 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (initiating an action 
against a programmer for modifying a PS3; in order for defendant Hotz to prevail, 
3
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The only way to understand this area of law is to identify the 
legal questions at the center of the debate because, while the 
answers courts give to these questions are not stable, the questions 
themselves have been.  The center of the debate is the interaction 
between the grant of exclusive rights in the core provisions of the 
Copyright Act and the later additions by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)7—the statute that protects technological 
locks against technological circumvention.8  The connection 
between contracts and technological measures is direct but not 
immediately clear.  Contracts that restrict access to software are 
legally enforceable documents, but also technological protective 
measures that control access to copyrighted material.9  This creates 
a catch-22 for the end user: either the end user clicks through the 
EULA and gives up a panoply of rights, often including fair use,10 
 
the modifications made must enable the PS3 to work with other programs and not 
facilitate copyright infringement). 
 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing to a copyright owner exclusive 
rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform, and display 
their copyrighted work); MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938, 
942–43, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (outlining the exclusive rights under § 106 and, later, 
the goals of the DMCA with copyright enforcement in the digital age and 
ultimately finding a new anti-circumvention right); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 528, 533, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing 
the relationships between rights under the Copyright Act and the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention provisions, and determining that the anti-circumvention provisions 
do not grant a new right); Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 
1192–1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (interpreting the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provisions, looking to the Copyright Act, Congressional intent, and finding the 
anti-circumvention provisions created a new cause of action and not a new right 
where circumvention is infringement and copyright protection would be 
implicated). 
 8. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1998)).  The DMCA 
contains three provisions that create a framework to address circumvention of 
technological measures that protect copyrighted works.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
1201(a)(1)–(2), 1201(b)(1) (2006). 
 9. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(describing that UCC 2-204(1) provides for different formations of contracts, such 
as a prompt on a computer screen, which can prevent access).  “ProCD proposed a 
contract that a buyer would accept by using the software after having an 
opportunity to read the license at leisure.  This Zeidenberg did.  He had no 
choice, because the software splashed the license on the screen and would not let 
him proceed without indicating acceptance.”  Id.  If you fail to click agree and still 
use the software, then you have circumvented a technological measure.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 10. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 
(E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (“The defendants in this case waived their ‘fair use’ right to reverse 
4
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or the end user circumvents the contract and is liable for that 
circumvention under the DMCA.11 
The question is whether corporations can use EULAs to 
control consumer behavior that has little or nothing to do with 
copyright.  It is clear that a copyright license that restricts a licensee 
from making copies makes use of a power that Congress intended 
to give to copyright holders.12  It is less clear that Congress intended 
to permit companies to turn actions such as “being rude while 
playing a video game,” “criticizing the game company while 
commenting on game message boards,” or “cheating while playing 
a game” into copyright infringements.  Companies can, of course, 
contract with users to use the software in certain ways,13 but it is not 
at all certain that any resulting breach of contract claims should be 
transformed into copyright infringements and/or DMCA 
violations. 
A number of courts have therefore held that there must be a 
“nexus” between a license restriction that a corporation seeks to 
 
engineer by agreeing to the licensing agreement.”); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 
Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (detailing that private parties are 
able to contract out of the limited ability to reverse engineer software—a fair use 
under the exemptions of the Copyright Act). 
 11. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title.”). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006) (granting federal copyright protection 
to authors of “original works of authorship”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) 
(providing for the exclusive right to reproduce work that is copyrighted).  But see 
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) (providing for the essential step defense unique to 
the software context).  The owner may make copies to their computer’s random 
access memory (RAM) where it is essential to the use of that software in 
conjunction with the machine and is used in no other way.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 
109(a) (2006) (providing for the first sale doctrine where a lawful owner of a copy 
of a copyrighted work is able, without the permission of the copyright owner, to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of the relevant copy).  The first sale 
doctrine allows owners of copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies.  Id.  
Both of these affirmative defenses are limited to owners of copyrighted works.  Id. 
 13. See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 
2010) (detailing Blizzard’s TOU and the prohibition of cheats, hacks, or other 
third-party software, essentially requiring fair play); Apple, iPOD Software License 
Agreement Single Use License, APPLE, ¶ 2(a) (July 20, 2010), 
http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/ipod.pdf [hereinafter iPOD SLA] 
(restricting the use of the iPOD software to use on one iPOD).  “[Y]ou may not 
copy, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, attempt to derive the source code 
of, decrypt, modify, or create derivative works of the iPod Software, iPod Software 
Updates, or any part thereof.”  Id. ¶ 2(c). 
5
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enforce on penalty of DMCA violation and some right granted by 
the Copyright Act.14  The Ninth Circuit has held otherwise: a clause 
unconnected to any core right granted by the Act would be 
enforceable as a copyright infringement if the user violated the 
EULA and as a DMCA violation if the user either circumvented the 
EULA or sought to avoid surveillance programs, such as Blizzard’s 
Warden, intended to enforce these contractual clauses.15 
Yet the Ninth Circuit has now recently recognized the 
dissonance caused by permitting corporations to turn every breach 
of contract into a claim for copyright infringement, an 
infringement of the DMCA, or even a criminal hacking claim.16  In 
 
 14. See Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (ruling that a copyright owner who seeks to impose liability on an 
accused circumventor must show a “reasonable relationship” between the 
circumvention and a protected interest under the Copyright Act of the copyright 
owner); see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 
421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202–03) 
(“[Section 1201] prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship 
to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”).  
“If such a nexus were not required, the careful balance that Congress sought to 
achieve between the ‘interests of content creators and information users’ would be 
upset.”  Id. at 1319 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 1, at 26 (1998)); Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(detailing that a technological measure must control access to a work falling under 
the general copyright protection of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).  “To the extent the Toner 
Loading Program is not a ‘work protected under [the copyright statute],’ the 
DMCA necessarily would not protect it.”  Id. at 550.  The court is finding a need 
for a technological measure, such as an EULA, to be a protected right under 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  See, e.g., ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996).  If the technological measure does not fall under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(2006), then a violation, or circumvention, of it would not be a copyright 
infringement. 
 15. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (finding that a copy made by a licensee is a violation of the license 
agreement and is also a copyright infringement).  See infra note 16 for a 
discussion of the RAM copy doctrine.  In MAI, the purchaser was a licensee, not an 
owner, and therefore not able to use the affirmative defense of “essential step.”  
MAI Sys. Corp., 911 F.2d at 519; see also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 
447 F.3d 769, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that defendant was a licensee of the 
software and therefore infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by copying the software 
and installing it on several computers, in violation of the license agreement); 
Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 
2004). 
 16. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941 (discussing the RAM copy doctrine 
loosely).  “This would allow software copyright owners far greater rights than 
Congress has generally conferred on copyright owners.”  Id. at 941.  The Ninth 
Circuit created the RAM copy doctrine in MAI.  See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d. at 519.  
The court determined that copies made to the computers’ RAM were a copy 
under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  Id.  The court also found that 
MAI’s copyright was violated by the licensee, Peak, through the unlicensed use of 
6
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a recent case, MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit adopted a novel approach to contractual 
construction that may serve to separate “play nice” contract clauses 
from “don’t illegally copy” core copyright license terms.17 
This article argues that such an approach might serve as a 
“nexus crystal”; a doctrinal catalyst around which doctrines that 
take seriously these important issues of consumer control could 
crystallize.  MDY does not adopt a nexus test for DMCA claims in 
the Ninth Circuit.18  But it nevertheless succeeds in separating 
social control from copyright licensing through a closer 
examination of the contractual clauses themselves; it does so by 
arguing that a mere rule of social control (“play nice”) is a 
contractual condition and not a condition of the intellectual 
property license. 
This article proceeds in three parts.  The first part discusses 
some pertinent legal literature and case law concerning the 
contractual control of online communities.  The second part 
discusses case law that I believe describes coalescing limits on 
contractual control.  One limit is familiar: some circuits require a 
nexus between a DMCA-protected technological lock and the 
exercise of some right granted by the Copyright Act to the 
copyright holder with respect to the locked-up material.  But a 
second limit is potentially significantly more far-reaching: a 
contractual construction that limits the kinds of social control a 
copyright holder can exercise via mass-market consumer contracts 
of adhesion.  Simply put, can software providers require their mass-
market consumers to not criticize the company on public forums or 
to not do business with an aftermarket software provider, as 
conditions of the intellectual property license?  This article argues 
that they cannot19 and that the MDY decision is one of the first 
 
MAI’s software.  Id.  The RAM copy doctrine makes it a copyright violation to 
violate any term of a license agreement where the software is copied into the 
computer’s RAM.  Id.  “The rationale would be that because the conduct occurs 
while the player’s computer is copying the software code into RAM in order for it 
to run, the violation is copyright infringement.”  MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941.  
Typically, a license does not allow for copies of the game into the computers RAM.  
Only owners are afforded the essential step defense.  See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 
621 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 17. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939 (setting out the contractual terms that 
limit the scope of a license as a “condition” and all other license terms as 
“covenants”). 
 18. Id. at 952. 
 19. It is worth underscoring that these kinds of community control clauses 
are not completely invalid—violations of the clauses may still be a breach of 
7
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cases to confront this issue head-on and resolve it correctly. 
The third part examines the district and appellate decisions in 
MDY v. Blizzard and discusses how the court navigates the labyrinth 
between copyright holders’ rights and their ability to dictate 
patterns of social behavior to online communities under threat of 
copyright infringement.  I then offer some conclusions. 
II. CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OF ONLINE COMMUNITIES 
The legal literature has previously addressed issues of 
contractual control from several distinct angles: the angle of the 
DMCA’s new anti-circumvention right, the angle of digital first sale 
and the “essential step” defense, the angle of contractual 
interpretation, and the angle of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA) immunity and anticompetition concerns.20  I will discuss 
each literature in turn before concluding that the contractual 
construction approach is the most under-theorized and thus most 
useful, new analysis for determining the reach and role of EULA 
terms in governing online conduct. 
A. The Legal Background 
There are several distinct legal approaches worth noting.  A 
good place to start is the academic and juridical discussion over the 
reach of the grant of rights in § 106 of the Copyright Act to 
copyright holders and the defenses in §§ 109 and 117 of fair usage 
and “essential steps.”21  Secondly, the interaction of the DMCA with 
these basic grants has, legal academics argue, caused a significant 
diminution in rights granted to consumers by the Copyright Act.22  
 
contract, even though they do not constitute intellectual property infringement.  
However, when I play a video game in a mean way, killing the avatar of the same 
player over and over again (a practice called “camping” and “griefing”) in 
violation of the Terms of Use, I have breached a contract, not violated the 
Copyright Act. 
 20. See, e.g., Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy 
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586580; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-social 
Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 435–36 
(2008); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 493, 495, 
535 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 776–80, 
784–87 (9th Cir. 2006); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Entrepreneurial Copyright Fair 
Use: Let the Independent Contractor Stand in the Shoes of the User, 57 ARK. L. REV 539, 
539–42, 576 (2004). 
 22. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright 
8
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A third legal literature discusses the impact of using mass-market 
consumer contracts to regulate shifting multi-million-member 
online communities.23  It is this literature that I think bears the 
most fruit in the current context, given that the MDY court’s 
decision turned on contractual interpretation grounds. 
Statutory immunizations for providers24 and 
antritrust/anticompetition concerns are also two other sources of 
law worth mentioning, although they have a more muted role in 
these cases.  Courts and academics have addressed the tension 
between the CDA’s broad immunization of providers’ breaches of 
contract and the broad promises (to create a safe environment 
online, to police bad actors, or to screen potential online dates with 
background checks) that providers make but are not required to 
enforce.25  Finally, copyright misuse26 and anticompetition claims27 
comprise a hefty undercurrent, if not a major theme, in this area of 
 
Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 281 n.10 (2001) (“As a practical matter, 
the survival of the limitations on copyright owner’s rights, as set out in Chapter 1 
of the Copyright Act of 1976, including the ‘first sale’ doctrine, and exemptions 
provided for by § 110, will now be available purely at the discretion of the 
copyright owner.”). 
 23. See Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn 
of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 287–94 (2007) (discussing the role of contracts 
in virtual worlds, specifically EULAs); see also Fairfield, supra note 20, at 432 
(covering the role of contracts in virtual worlds and why they are problematic 
because they supplant the common law process and default rules). 
 24. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 25. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(refusing to dismiss claims pursuant to § 230 because plaintiff established a prima 
facie case of promissory estoppel); see also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield 
for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010) (detailing the first 
empirical study of § 230 and how it has been applied by courts, in the end 
haphazardly, with a mixed outcome for providers); Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: 
Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172–
76, 201 (2006) (discussing the Communications Decency Act’s (CDA) background 
and its problems and fitting it with Wikipedia to avoid liability). 
 26. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 
197 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the fair use doctrine may be implicated if 
copyright misuse will stifle the very creativity that the copyright law was designed to 
foster); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 
1997) (finding that conditioning the license on a promise not to use competitors’ 
products constituted a misuse of the copyright); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 
911 F.2d 970, 978–79 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the copyright holder misused 
its copyright by including in licensing agreements a provision that neither the 
licensee company nor its officers and employees could develop competing goods 
for the term of the ninety-nine year agreement). 
 27. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 204 (“Anti-competitive licensing agreements 
may conflict with the purpose behind a copyright’s protection by depriving the 
public of the would-be competitor’s creativity.”). 
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law.  The contracts we are talking about almost invariably forbid a 
consumer from doing business with the seller’s aftermarket rival.  
Although antitrust has been given short shrift in information 
technology cases, usually because of the argument that the speed of 
the information industry does away with the need for antitrust 
controls,28 the subtext of these cases is clearly one of 
anticompetition and thus this legal approach should be addressed.  
This section addresses each of the above legal approaches briefly, 
by way of providing background, before proceeding to Part B for a 
closer look at some of the key cases. 
1. The Copyright Act’s Basic Limits on Contractual Control 
The judicial interpretation of the basic grants and defenses of 
the Copyright Act remains in motion.  The first set of articles and 
decisions discussing the limits of contractual control of online 
communities concerns the limits set out in the Copyright Act itself 
in §§ 109 and 117.  These sections establish the first sale doctrine 
and its ancillary “essential step” defense.  First sale is the doctrine 
that limits the copyright holder’s rights to the first sale of a copy of 
copyrighted materials; after that first sale, she has exhausted her 
rights and cannot control what is done with the book.29  Thus, for 
example, after my uncle finished his anatomy and physiology class 
in medical school, he took his textbook out to a field and shot it. 
 That was his right, since he owned that copy of the textbook.  The 
attendant right of taking an “essential step” was created by 
Congress to permit an owner of software to load a copy of the 
software without permission of the copyright holder if doing so was 
an essential step to use of the software.30 
The first sale doctrine and essential step defense might at first 
blush seem to limit the control that intellectual property holders 
 
 28. STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT: 
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 246, 256 (2001) (discussing the 
fears over anticompetitive behaviors, such as decreased supply and rising prices, 
but noting that the reality is that software prices have dropped and supplies have 
increased).  Liebowitz and Margolis argue that antitrust controls then are 
misplaced in the software context of the pace of innovation and the reality that 
where products are better, they will succeed but where they are inferior, they will 
fail.  Id.  For a broad treatment of the idea of path dependence and network 
effects and their frailty according to Liebowitz and Margolis, refer to chapters one 
and two. 
 29. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 30. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006). 
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can assert over their customers.31  This is because the owner of a 
copy of software is nominally free to dispose of it as she sees fit 
(thus eliminating any restrictive aftermarket controls placed on it 
by the copyright holder) and because owners of the software are 
free to load the software into random access memory (RAM) as an 
essential step of using the software.32 
The first sale doctrine and essential step defense have been 
severely eroded by a controversial line of cases rooted in the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.33  MAI 
held that a repair person made an illicit copy of a computer 
program—and violated the Copyright Act—merely by turning a 
computer on.34  The court reasoned that when a user turns a 
computer on, the user copies the software from read only memory 
(ROM) into RAM and thus makes a copy.35  If, at that moment, the 
copy made into RAM is contemporaneous with some action that 
violates the terms of the license agreement, then the resulting RAM 
copy constitutes copyright infringement.  This is termed the RAM 
copy doctrine.36 
 
 31. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006).  These two 
statutory rights limit MAI’s RAM copy doctrine.  See supra note 16 for a discussion 
of the RAM copy doctrine.  Under the RAM copy doctrine, a license agreement 
can specify that a user is not allowed to make copies, but if it is determined by the 
court that the purchaser is an owner and not a licensee, then they are able to 
make copies, in contravention of the license agreement.  The weight under the 
RAM copy doctrine is on the license agreement, where the affirmative defenses of 
first sale and essential step place the weight on whether the software is owned or 
licensed.  For these defenses, the license agreement by itself is not dispositive.  Cf. 
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that some 
contracts, “consistent with their designation as loans or licenses,” are not sales). 
 32. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006). 
 33. 991 F.2d at 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ince we find that the copy 
created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,’ 
we hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the 
Copyright Act.”).  This copy is then subject to the anti-circumvention regime 
under the DMCA.  See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 942–46 
(9th Cir. 2010); see also Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109–11 (9th Cir. 
2010) (discussing the essential step defense); Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the essential step 
defense did not apply because defendant was not an owner of the software and 
plaintiff’s license imposed significant restrictions). 
 34. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518–19. 
 35. Id. at 518. 
 36. The RAM copy doctrine has fared differently in different circuits.  See 
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding that an embodiment and durational requirement needed to be met in 
order for a data stream to be fixed).  The Second Circuit’s decision presented an 
apparent circuit split that the parties to Cartoon Network wanted addressed.  See 
KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34719, CARTOON NETWORK LP V. CSC 
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The RAM copy doctrine first gutted the protections that § 109 
granted to owners of a particular copy of software.  The problem is 
that courts have (in my opinion) misconstrued the Copyright Act 
and have permitted private contracts to undo what Congress did.  
Courts rely on the fiction that the buyer of software is not really the 
owner but merely the licensee of the software.37  The 
legal literature focuses on the question of whether buyers of 
software are truly owners of that copy of the software or whether 
the reservation of a license precludes ownership.38  It may seem 
obvious that it does not, since purchasing a book grants ownership 
of a copy of the book, as well as a limited license to the contents 
within. 
But courts have generally held that purchasers of software do 
not own what they buy largely because the license simply asserts 
that the buyer of software is not a buyer.  Giving this much weight 
to the seller’s characterization of ownership interests in software is, 
in my mind, incorrect.  The statute contemplates a norm by which 
buyers would have an ownership interest in a given copy of software 
(but obviously not ownership of the intellectual property itself).39 
Regarding the “essential step” defense, because the purchaser 
is not the owner of a given copy but a “mere” licensee, she does not 
benefit from the right to freely dispose of her copy of the software.  
 
HOLDINGS, INC.: REMOTE-STORAGE DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDERS AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
10 n.90 (2009), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs 
/RL34719_090706.pdf (detailing that, in June 2009, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari for review of the apparent circuit split created by the Second Circuit’s 
ruling and therefore suggesting that MAI and Cartoon Networks could be 
harmonized). 
 37. See Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. 
Supp. 356, 367, (E.D. Va. 1994) (“MAI customers are not ‘owners’ of the 
copyrighted software; they possess only the limited rights set forth in their 
licensing agreements.”); see also Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110–12 (establishing a three 
point framework to determine if a purchaser of software is an owner or licensee).  
The court looked to the license to determine if the license specified that the user 
was a licensee or owner.  It is therefore up to the seller to determine the property 
rights of a buyer and not the underlying exchange.  But see Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170–72 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (determining the transfer 
was a sale because of the underlying facts of the transaction and the terms in the 
agreements). 
 38. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 
1106–09 (2008) (outlining the dilemma of software transactions: whether they are 
sales or licenses). 
 39. See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of 
Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1343–44 (2001) (discussing the 
DMCA and its overreach and arguing for an unlimited right to access digital 
copies in one’s possession based on what the DMCA encroaches upon). 
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Nor does she benefit from the “essential step” defense, which 
would protect her from claims that I had made an illicit copy 
merely by turning an electronic device on. 
Following the RAM copy doctrine to its logical conclusions 
leads the law to some strange distinctions.  According to the RAM 
copy doctrine, I have done nothing whatsoever to invoke copyright 
when I page through a paperback in a bookstore.  However, if I 
page through the same book in the same store on a Kindle, I have 
made a copy of the book (by turning the Kindle on) and am liable 
for copyright infringement if I have done so in violation of any 
term or condition attached to the e-Book.  The RAM copy doctrine 
has been widely criticized40 and superseded by statute in its narrow 
holding (that a repair man cannot turn on a computer to service 
it); but it remains the law of the land, at least in the Ninth Circuit.41 
Court decisions in this area have spurred verdant and 
indignant legal literature in response.42  Although this literature 
touches on the issues addressed here, I consider first sale and 
essential step to be adequately theorized in the legal academic 
literature, although perhaps misanalyzed by courts. 
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Anti-Circumvention 
Right 
Scholars also have debated the reach and role of the DMCA 
and the damage that the Act has caused to bedrock fair use rights 
(such as the right to reverse engineer, modify, or create add-on 
projects) that have long been the foundation stones of the open 
 
 40. For critical treatment, see Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1067, 1075–80 (2010) (detailing the two main criticisms, interpretive 
failings and policy considerations, of the RAM copy doctrine). 
 41. The RAM copy doctrine is superseded by the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provisions.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1) (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Jonathan Band, A New Day for the DMCA: The Chamberlain and 
Lexmark Decisions, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 987 (2004), available at 
http://www.policybandwidth.com/publications/JBand-DMCABNA_v1.pdf 
[hereinafter A New Day for the DMCA] (detailing two circuit court decisions, 
Chamberlain v. Skylink and Lexmark v. Static Control Components); Carver, supra note 
20, at 1894–95 (discussing problems with the MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc. decision); Ross Shikowitz, Note, License to Kill: MDY v. Blizzard 
and the Battle over Copyright in World of Warcraft, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2010) 
(arguing the district court decision in MDY Indust., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, 
Inc. was wrongly decided); Fred Von Lohmann, Unintended Consequences: Twelve 
Years Under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 2010), http:// 
www.eff.org/files/eff-unintended-consequences-12-years.pdf (discussing how the 
DMCA has been applied in various cases). 
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internet architecture.43  The dispute over the reach and role of the 
DMCA is ground fairly well trodden.44  The Act has been accused of 
killing free speech and lauded for providing the legal assurances 
content owners needed to finally make their content available 
online.  The DMCA illegalizes both hacking into copyrighted 
material and trafficking in tools that are primarily designed or 
intended to hack into copyrighted material or trafficking in tools 
that bypass copy protection of copyrighted material.45 
Specifically, copyright-holder-drafted EULAs and the DMCA 
combine to grant greater rights than might be at first apparent.  
The EULA is the door to the copyrighted material, and the DMCA 
says that you must agree to the EULA or suffer legal sanction for 
breaking down the door.46  Thus, for example, although the right 
to reverse engineer code to make other interoperable code is a 
longstanding fair use right and, indeed, the bedrock of the modern 
internet,47 if an employee at a software development firm clicks “I 
Agree” to an EULA that waives reverse engineering rights, the 
whole firm’s ability to make interoperable software may evaporate.48  
 
 43. See Amir Hassanabadi, Viacom v. Youtube: All Eyes Blind—The Limits of the 
DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809194 (discussing the limitations of the DMCA and 
concluding that the DMCA is no longer capable of protecting service providers 
and content owners from copyright infringement suits); Lipton, supra note 20, at 
522 (arguing that the DMCA may have overreached beyond the “digital copyright 
piracy” it was meant to prevent and into other areas Congress did not foresee); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1)–(2) (2006) (explaining the limited purposes for which 
reverse engineering is lawful); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1095, 1139 (2003) (“[T]he reverse engineering exception does not extend to 
reverse engineering hardware or data.  Neither does it allow reverse engineering 
for any purpose other than software interoperability.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Carver, supra note 20; Hassanabadi, supra note 43; Lipton, supra 
note 20. 
 45. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1) (2006). 
 46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for discussion about EULAs as 
both a contract and technological protection measure of copyrighted work.  This 
is the idea of the EULA as fitting under the DMCA because it is a technological 
measure that is protected under 17 U.S.C. § 1201.  “No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title.”  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 47. This is necessarily so as the Internet is a decentralized network.  In order 
to communicate, and therefore create the Internet, different software and network 
systems must be able to communicate and work together or be interoperable.  See 
New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing 
network systems and the important role of interoperability when communicating 
on networks as there is no one single type of computer, hardware, or code), aff’d, 
373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 48. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (outlining the fair use limitation on exclusive 
rights); 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2010); see also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/12
2011] NEXUS CRYSTALS 57 
Of course, if the employee had reverse compiled the code and 
avoided the EULA in order to preserve development rights, that 
bypass would make the third-party developer liable under the 
DMCA.49  This creates a relatively well-known DMCA catch-22: a 
company that wishes to exercise its fair use rights to make an 
interoperable product is damned if they click through the EULA 
and damned if they do not.50 
3. Contract Construction as a Limit on Copyright Control 
Yet another approach focuses on the community-binding 
contracts themselves and asks whether private law contracts are the 
ideal vehicle for protecting public law concerns like fair use and 
public access to information.  This literature is the most under-
theorized of the three and also the one to which I have contributed 
somewhat and thus the one on which this article focuses.51  For 
example, the MDY decisions have been parsed by other academics 
on the prior two grounds: the reach and role of the DMCA52 and 
the questions of digital first sale and essential step.53  But while 
there has been adequate discussion of the first sale and essential 
 
Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[W]e 
advocate a limited right to reverse engineer patented computer programs in order 
to gain access to and study those programs and to duplicate their unprotected 
elements.  Such a right is firmly established in copyright law, and seems 
unexceptional as a policy matter even in patent law.”).  But see MAI Sys. Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a copy made 
by a licensee is a violation of the license agreement and is also a copyright 
infringement); supra text accompanying note 16.  The employee who signs the 
EULA binds the company to that contract and its terms, even if they specify a 
waiver of the fair use exemption.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 49. The company would be liable as the EULA acts as a technological 
measure and would have been circumvented.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A); see 
also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 50. This is due to the license agreements widely in use.  These agreements 
often restrict fair use rights.  See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the software developer gave up its fair use right to reverse 
engineer software for interoperability purposes when an employee clicked “I 
Agree” on a Blizzard EULA); Von Lohmann, supra note 42, at 1 (“[T]he DMCA 
grants to copyright owners the power to unilaterally eliminate the public’s fair use 
rights.”). 
 51. See generally Fairfield, supra note 20 (discussing the limitations on contract 
law in governing virtual worlds). 
 52. See, e.g., Jessica Gallegos, Note, A New Role for Tortious Interference in the 
Digital Age: A Model to Enforce End User License Agreements, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 
419–24 (2011) (discussing the MDY cases and their effect on the DMCA, tortious 
interference, and EULAs). 
 53. See Hassanabadi, supra note 43; Lipton, supra note 20; see also supra note 
41 and accompanying text. 
15
Fairfield: Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Vi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
58 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
step implications of MDY, there has been much less and too little 
discussion of the contractual interpretation element of the cases.  
This is what I find fascinating about the MDY cases: the appellate 
court’s interpretation of contractual conditions and covenants 
overruled the district court’s conventional application of the first 
sale, essential step, and RAM copy doctrines, as a matter of contract 
interpretation.  In so doing, the case directly undermines the trifecta 
of legal errors that have plagued the private regulation of 
intellectual property.54  Thus, this piece focuses on the Ninth 
Circuit’s under-examined contractual interpretation analysis. 
4. Communications Decency Act Section 230 and the 
Unenforceability of Consumer Protection Provisions by Consumers 
There are two other subtexts in these cases.  The first is that 
although community-governing EULAs make many pretty promises 
to consumers (for example, promises to parents about safety, to 
online daters about the backgrounds of potential romantic 
interests, or to online buyers about the risks of their online 
transactions), those promises are largely unenforceable.  This is 
 
 54. The Ninth Circuit previously held that a license agreement can control 
the behavior of an end user.  See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 
(9th Cir. 2010); supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing RAM copy 
doctrine).  The shift appears subtle in MDY but is significant.  See MDY Indus., 629 
F.3d. at 939 (setting out the contractual terms that limit the scope of a license as a 
“condition” and all other license terms as “covenants”).  The shift is that a court 
reviewing contract terms in one case has the usual effect of a one-shot 
engagement.  The parties adapt and rewrite the contract but MDY is different.  
The court states that not only is the license agreement written in a way that does 
not impose copyright liability, as it is a covenant, but also that the interpretation of 
the contractual terms is not a one-time assessment.  Id. at 939–40 (“A . . . user 
commits copyright infringement by playing [World of Warcraft] while violating a 
ToU term that is a license condition.  To establish copyright infringement . . . [the 
plaintiff] must demonstrate that the violated term—ToU § 4(B)—is a condition 
rather than a covenant. . . . Applying these principles, ToU . . . prohibitions . . . are 
covenants rather than copyright-enforceable conditions.”) (citations omitted).  
The court set out a new framework, based on two types of clauses that could not be 
contracted around.  The court’s framework of contractual conditions and 
covenants directly undermines MAI and the RAM copy doctrine: 
Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or any software copyright holder—
could designate any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright 
infringement, by purporting to condition the license on the player’s 
abstention from the disfavored conduct.  The rationale would be that 
because the conduct occurs while the player’s computer is copying the 
software code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright 
infringement.  This would allow software copyright owners far greater 
rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright owners. 
Id. at 941. 
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due to CDA § 23055 that immunizes an interactive computing 
services provider from claims arising out of the tortious acts of 
users and immunizes the censorship attempts of corporate entities 
by granting a near-absolute privilege to remove “objectionable 
material.”56 
The result of combining these statutes with cleverly-worded 
EULAs and TOUs is somewhat distressing.  Online communities of 
all sorts are governed by EULAs full of promises that users cannot 
enforce against one another due to lack of privity and cannot 
enforce against the service provider who is immunized under § 
230.57  Thus, for example, when an online dating service provider 
promised that all members of the service were over eighteen but 
failed to ensure that this is so, the provider was not held liable for 
its own breach of contract because the breach was caused by false 
 
 55. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 56. See id. § 230(c) (providing for protection of providers for screening of 
offensive material, immunizing providers from liability where they do so).  Section 
230(c)(2)(A) specifically states that 
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected . . . . 
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 57. EULAs are by construction agreements between the company and the 
user, not between users.  For example, the concerns raised by MDY’s Glider 
program that is the subject of MDY did not result in suits between users with the 
program and those without.  This is despite the claim by Blizzard that they 
received 465,000 complaints about World of Warcraft bots from December 2004 to 
March 2008.  MDY, 629 F.3d at 936.  Players did not sue each other; rather, the 
company sued a third party, here MDY.  See Fairfield, supra note 20, at 453 
(detailing a case where users sued gold farmers within Blizzard’s World of 
Warcraft game, asserting that all players are third-party beneficiaries of every other 
player’s promise to Blizzard to refrain from engaging in the exchange of virtual 
objects for real money).  “Third-party-beneficiary clauses require that the 
beneficiary be the intended, not just the incidental, beneficiary of a contractual 
promise.”  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) 
(distinguishing “incidental” from “intended” beneficiaries of contract promises).  
For § 230 treatment, see Fairfield, supra note 20, at 450 n.93: 
Even if a virtual-world provider promises . . . to ban bad actors, those 
promises may be held unenforceable under [§ 230 of the] 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)).  This 
statute has been broadly interpreted to hold internet service providers 
immune to claims based on the actions of their users.  See Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding internet 
service providers broadly immune from claims based on bad acts of 
users); . . . Doe v. Friend Finder Network, Inc. [540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D. 
N.H. 2008) (finding the same)]. 
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information (the age) entered by a third party (a minor) who 
illicitly made use of the site.58  Similarly, consumers who have sued 
dating sites based on other failures have been met with similar 
judicial opposition.59  For example, a consumer who is sexually 
assaulted by someone she met through an online service would 
have an extremely difficult time enforcing the service’s promise to 
screen out users with violent histories.60 
All of this has an odd effect on the EULAs and TOUs that set 
the rules for enormous (hundreds of millions strong) online 
communities; these rules are used to attract consumers with the 
promise of a safe space, but they are generally alterable at the near-
whim of the service provider and enforcement is absolutely a 
matter of discretion.  On a similar note, other courts have voiced 
some distress that these EULAs and TOUs are not only 
unenforceable by the consumers they purport to protect, but are 
alterable at the near-whim of the license drafter.61  At least one 
court has noted that such a state of affairs approaches the 
antiquated notion of “illusoriness”—the notion that a TOU that 
reserves the untrammeled right to alter the terms without 
consideration to the consumer constitutes no contract at all.62 
This forms an important subtext to the cases examined below.  
While we look at the enforceability by a company of its TOU or 
EULAs, it is critical to remember that these cases do not run both 
ways.  What is good for the goose is not good for the gander.  The 
promises made by consumers in EULAs and TOUs are often 
enforced by courts;63 the promises made by corporations to 
 
 58. See, e.g., Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(holding that CDA § 230 proscribes web provider SexSearch’s liability when a 
female web user falsely put her age as eighteen on the website).  But see Doe v. 
SexSearch, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of counts for failure 
to state a claim but declining to adopt the District Court’s holding that § 230 
immunizes Internet computer services providers (ICSPs) from all state law claims). 
 59. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding 
MySpace not liable on CDA § 230 grounds for sexual assault of minor, Doe, by 
someone she met via the service). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009) 
(holding that an arbitration clause was illusory because drafter could alter it at 
will); see also Eric Goldman, Stop Saying “We Can Amend This Agreement Whenever We 
Want”!—Harris v. Blockbuster, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 10, 2009, 10:26 AM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/stop_saying_we_1.htm 
(criticizing the use of amendment clauses and highlighting the trouble it caused 
Blockbuster). 
 62. See Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99. 
 63. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
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consumers (for example, promises to parents about safety or 
representations to an online dater about the arrest record of her 
next date) are not.64 
5. Overtones of Anticompetition 
There are also strong overtones of anticompetition and 
antitrust inherent in deciding what promises content holders 
should be able to extract from consumers through the catch-22 
that the courts have handed to corporations.  Of course, the very 
first promises extracted through EULAs are anticompetitive ones, 
such as promises not to do business with a competitor in a product 
aftermarket.65  Courts have traditionally asked when a company may 
use its control over content to destroy competition66 but have used 
this power much less in the information marketplace.67  The idea is 
that the very speed of innovation in the software industry 
supposedly obviates the need for traditional antitrust remedies.68 
 
the software developer gave up its fair use right to reverse engineer software for 
interoperability purposes when an employee clicked “I Agree” on a Blizzard 
EULA). 
 64. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(describing that the contract at issue was not a battle-of-the-forms scenario and 
instead there was one contract, which under U.C.C. § 2-204 allowed the vendor, as 
master of the offer, to set the terms of acceptance).  The contract then cuts one 
way—against the buyer. 
 65. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–32 (2006) 
(discussing the use of a license dealing with printing technology between 
companies).  “The OEMs agree that they will purchase their ink exclusively from 
petitioners, and that neither they nor their customers will refill the patented 
containers with ink of any kind.”  Id. at 32; United States v. Microsoft Corp. 
(Microsoft I), 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll the OEM license restrictions 
at issue represent uses of Microsoft’s market power to protect its monopoly, 
unredeemed by any legitimate justification.”); see also MDY Indus. v. Blizzard 
Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) (detailing the Blizzard TOU and its 
prohibition on the use of third-party software). 
 66. See Stuart M. Reynolds, Jr., The Relationship of Antitrust Laws to Regulated 
Industries and Intellectual Property in the New Marketplace, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 2 (2002) (“Traditional rules of antitrust apply even in highly regulated 
industries, such as the power industry.”). 
 67. See Peter Dizikes, Justice Dept. Drops Microsoft Breakup Request, ABC NEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87749&page=1 
(“Rather than break up the company into separate operating systems and 
applications businesses, the Justice Department said the government will pursue 
restrictions on Microsoft’s business practices to ‘obtain prompt, effective and 
certain relief’ for consumers.”). 
 68. See Microsoft I, 253 F.3d at 65 (“As with the license restrictions, we consider 
first whether the suspect actions had an anticompetitive effect, and then whether 
[there is] a procompetitive justification for them.”); see also LIEBOWITZ & 
MARGOLIS, supra note 28, at 246, 256. 
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 Thus the first cases challenging a manufacturer’s right to control 
aftermarkets were direct antitrust claims, such as claims by a 
company against a competitor that the competitor accessed the 
plaintiff’s content in violation of intellectual property law as a 
means of blocking competing products.69  But due to the muted 
reception of anticompetition claims in information technology 
cases, the current set of attacks on aftermarkets are now being 
litigated more as subtext to the contractual interpretation, 
copyright scope, and DMCA reach and role arguments. 
B. The Emerging Case Law 
This section discusses the circuit split currently underway 
between the Federal, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with respect to 
whether a copyright holder may require any behavior she likes of 
her users as a condition of an intellectual property license.70  The 
 
 69. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 446 (2007) 
(“Microsoft further acknowledged that by licensing copies of Windows to 
manufacturers of computers sold in the United States, it induced infringement of 
AT & T’s patent.”) (footnote omitted). 
 70. The circuit split is comprised of three approaches as to whether violations 
of a license agreement can result in copyright infringement.  The Federal Circuit 
Court’s view in Chamberlain is essentially the same as the Sixth Circuit Court’s view 
in Lexmark.  The Ninth Circuit issued two different approaches, first with MAI and, 
second, in the recent MDY decision.  Compare Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that the DMCA’s 
anti-circumvention provisions do not give a new anti-circumvention right and 
rather give a cause of action for rights provided under preexisting copyright 
protection), and Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA create a new cause of action for copyrights already in place and that 
circumvention is not infringement), with MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 
991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining that an action of an end user was both 
a violation of a license agreement and a copyright infringement), and MDY Indus., 
629 F.3d at 941 (rejecting the RAM copy doctrine and interpreting the license 
agreement to contain covenants rather than conditions and that the license 
agreement in dispute not only did not reach copyright infringement but also that 
later license agreements would be so affected).  The effect of the Federal Circuit’s 
ruling is that a violation of a license agreement will not be treated as copyright 
infringement unless that violation is also a right protected under copyright.  The 
court in Lexmark stated the following: 
All three liability provisions of this section of the DMCA require the 
claimant to show that the ‘technological measure’ at issue ‘controls 
access to a work protected under this title,’ see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)–
(C), which is to say a work protected under the general copyright statute, 
id. § 102(a).  To the extent the Toner Loading Program is not a “‘work 
protected under [the copyright statute]’… the DMCA necessarily would 
not protect it. 
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550.  The Ninth Circuit’s finding in MAI is based on the RAM 
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legal questions of MDY, and thus the ones to keep in mind, are first 
whether a copyright holder may require its consumers to stop 
doing business with a competitor after the competitor markets a 
competing aftermarket program and second, more strongly, 
whether the copyright holder can place license conditions 
requiring users to vote Democratic or wear pink (or not to be rude 
or not to criticize the company, which are real-world EULA or TOU 
conditions) on pain of infringement of intellectual property 
rights.71 
The MDY court likewise sought to ascertain when a company 
may forbid its customers from doing business with other companies 
as a condition of an intellectual property license.72  (A thought 
experiment: imagine if the same intellectual property claims now 
being raised by content providers had been asserted by the 
developers of TCP/IP—the basic transmission packet routing 
protocol that runs the Internet—where the use of others’ servers 
and other computing resources is essentially ubiquitous.)  These 
issues have currently developed into a good old-fashioned circuit 
split in the appellate courts, as the next sections describe. 
A few caveats seem appropriate at this point.  I describe here a 
line of cases that tend to limit the ability of manufacturers qua 
intellectual property holders to control the non-intellectual-
property related actions of their customers.  I do this with full 
awareness that the cases I describe below focus on limiting the 
scope of the DMCA in order to achieve these limits, while MDY 
does so via contractual construction of the clauses of the EULA 
(that is the point of the article).  I also do so knowing that there are 
other cases, for example, those rooted in Universal Studios v. 
Reimerdes, that cut the other way by holding that the DMCA ushered 
in a new legal era in which copyright holders may demand nearly 
anything of consumers on pain of copyright infringement.73 
 
copy doctrine.  The RAM copy doctrine makes it a copyright violation to violate 
any term of a license agreement where the software is copied into the computer’s 
RAM.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 71. These conditions are similar to the provision in Blizzard’s EULA and 
TOU preventing cheating.  None of these hypothetical conditions or the real 
world example of the prohibited use of “bots” have a direct relationship with 
copyright protections.  The court in MDY rejected this idea.  See MDY Indus., 629 
F.3d at 941.  The new ruling went against the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision 
supporting this EULA Copyright control.  See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 511. 
 72. This is exactly what Blizzard attempted to do.  See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 
939 (laying out a framework for copyright and contractual terms for licenses which 
turn on whether the terms of the license affect the scope of the license). 
 73. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
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My goal is straightforward.  I identify a growing trend in which 
some courts limit contractual controls exercised by intellectual 
property holders over consumers, and then observe a recent and 
important precedent in a critical circuit (the MDY line of cases in 
the Ninth Circuit) that actually strengthens that trend, rather than 
undermines it. 
1. Chamberlain v. Skylink 
In Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies,74 the Federal 
Circuit decided whether a company might leverage control over 
intellectual property embedded in a garage door.  In Chamberlain, 
the intellectual property at issue was a computer authentication 
program embedded in the door which was used to exclude 
competitors from selling generic garage door openers.75  The 
garage doors worked by responding to a rolling authentication 
code—it changed regularly, ostensibly to prevent someone with 
another garage door opener from breaking into the house but in 
actuality to prevent competitors from making garage door openers 
that would interoperate with the garage door.76  The defendant did 
precisely that anyway by offering a generic garage door opener that 
was able to circumvent Chamberlain’s authentication sequence.77 
Chamberlain sued, and the district court held for Skylink, 
noting that because Chamberlain did not condition its sale to users 
on not using generic remote controls, the sale was unconditional78 
and users did not commit any copyright infringement when they 
used a generic remote.79  The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding 
that Chamberlain had not met its burden of showing that the 
access by Chamberlain users using generic garage door openers was 
unauthorized, and thus that there was no circumvention of access 
controls such that a DMCA claim could be sustained.80 
The more important part of the court’s analysis bore on the 
requirement that there be a nexus between the exercise of the 
exclusionary right of the DMCA and some right granted by the 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 74. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 75. Id. at 1183. 
 76. Id. at 1183–85. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 1187. 
 79. Id. at 1187–88. 
 80. Id. at 1202–03. 
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Copyright Act.81  The court noted the following: 
Chamberlain, however, has failed to show not only the 
requisite lack of authorization, but also the necessary fifth 
element of its claim, the critical nexus between access and 
protection.  Chamberlain neither alleged copyright 
infringement nor explained how the access provided by the 
Model 39 transmitter facilitates the infringement of any right that 
the Copyright Act protects.  There can therefore be no 
reasonable relationship between the access that 
homeowners gain to Chamberlain’s copyrighted software 
when using Skylink’s Model 39 transmitter and the 
protections that the Copyright Act grants to 
Chamberlain.82 
Both the district and appellate courts held that there was no 
underlying copyright violation when Chamberlain’s customers used 
a generic remote.83  Thus, the requisite nexus between a copyright 
violation and the protections granted by the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention right simply did not exist.  As a result, neither the 
purchaser nor the manufacturer of the generic garage door remote 
were liable for copyright infringement or a DMCA violation.  The 
following discussion may clarify how near a miss the entire generic 
aftermarket add-on industry had. 
2. Lexmark v. Static Control Components 
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,84 
the Sixth Circuit implicitly required a nexus between the 
technological access control protected by the DMCA—the lock—
and some right protected under the Copyright Act.85  Lexmark sold 
printers and printer cartridges.86  Lexmark marketed “single-use” 
non-refillable printer cartridges; these cartridges were sold at a 
discount up front but could not be refilled because of a computer 
control that caused the printer to reject refilled single-use 
cartridges.87  Static Control Components marketed a program that 
permitted Lexmark buyers to bypass the single-use control and thus 
refill and reuse single use cartridges.88 
 
 81. Id. at 1204. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 85. See id. at 549–50. 
 86. Id. at 529. 
 87. Id. at 529–30. 
 88. Id. at 529–31. 
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The Sixth Circuit engaged in a somewhat more circuitous 
analysis than did the Chamberlain court, but came to the same 
result.89  The district court first noted that the copyrighted material 
claimed—the authentication sequence that caused the printer to 
accept or reject the cartridge—was the same as the access control 
that Lexmark argued Static Control Components had 
circumvented in violation of the DMCA.90  The Lexmark court 
decided that the access control and the copyrighted material 
protected by the access control could not be the same material.91  
The Lexmark court also determined that the numeric sequence 
necessary to authenticate the cartridges by the printer was the only 
way to so authenticate and thus that the mathematical sequence’s 
function “merged” with the copyrightable elements.92  As a result, 
the copyrightable elements’ functional components were not 
protected and due to the merger, neither was the numerical 
sequence protected by copyright.93 
A second critical finding by the Lexmark court was that the 
authentication sequence did not provide “access” to any 
copyrighted material.94  Rather, the purchase of the printer and 
cartridge provided “access.”95  In that respect, the software 
handshake protocol that controlled cartridge use was not deemed 
to qualify as a technological protection measure protected under 
the DMCA at all. 
The Lexmark court in the end made a move similar to that of 
the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain.  The court required that the 
DMCA “lock” first “provide[] access” to copyrighted material.  
Secondly, and most importantly, the court then required that the 
action performed with the copyrighted material must have some 
relationship to the right protected under the Copyright Act—either 
a right of copying, distributing, performing, creating derivative 
work, or so on.96  Because the court found that the “lock” protected 
no right of the software creator under the Copyright Act, the court 
 
 89. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
 90. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546. 
 91. Id. at 546, 547, 550. 
 92. Id. at 535–36. 
 93. Id. at 535–44. 
 94. Id. at 546 (“It is not Lexmark’s authentication sequence that ‘controls 
access’ to the Printer Engine Program. . . . It is the purchase of a Lexmark printer 
that allows ‘access’ to the program.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 549–50; see Chamberlain Grp, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 
1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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determined that Static Control Components’ circumvention of the 
printer authentication sequence was not a violation of the DMCA.97 
3. MGE UPS Systems v. GE Consumer & Industrial 
The Fifth Circuit, in MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v. GE Consumer & 
Industrial, Inc.,98 acted more recently to limit the scope of 
contractual control that intellectual property holders can assert 
over their customers.99  The MGE court rejected a DMCA claim 
asserted by a manufacturer of an encrypted security dongle—
generally a USB stick used to generate a rolling authentication 
code just like that used in the garage door in Chamberlain—only this 
time the dongle granted access to the consumer’s own computer.100  
MGE UPS manufactured a dongle that controlled access to 
diagnostic programs in the hardware that it sold.101  Hackers then 
posted the circumvention code on the Internet.102  A GE employee 
used the hacked software, and MGE UPS sued—and lost—on the 
DMCA claim.103  The court limited the dongle creator’s ability to 
control a customer’s access to the customer’s own computer system 
by narrowing the definition of circumvention: 
The DMCA defines circumvention broadly to include not 
only disabling protections, but also avoiding or bypassing 
them. . . . We, however, do not construe “bypass” or 
“avoid” to encompass use of a copyrighted work 
subsequent to a circumvention merely because that use 
would have been subject to a technological measure that 
would have controlled access to the work, but for that 
circumvention.  So broad a construction would extend the 
DMCA beyond its intended purposes to reach extensive 
 
 97. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 563–64. 
 98. 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010) (determining that MGE had not shown 
circumvention of its software protections). 
 99. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 612 F.3d 760, 765 
(5th Cir. 2010) (embracing the Federal Circuit’s approach in Chamberlain 
requiring an infringement nexus), withdrawn, 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010).  The 
court avoided adding to the circuit split by not citing Chamberlain but still added to 
the split by finding that once a measure is circumvented, subsequent use does not 
constitute a per se violation of the DMCA.  MGE, 622 F.3d at 366. 
 100. MGE, 622 F.3d at 364, 366; see also Tim Armstrong, DMCA: Fifth Circuit 
Inches Closer to “Fair Circumvention” Defense, INFO/LAW (July 26, 2010), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2010/07/26/dmca-fifth-circuit-inches-
closer-to-fair-circumvention-defense/ [hereinafter DMCA Fair Defense] (praising 
the outcome of the decision but criticizing the court’s cursory analysis). 
 101. MGE, 622 F.3d at 364. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 366. 
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conduct already well-regulated by existing copyright 
laws.104  MGE did not present any evidence showing that a 
GE/PMI representative altered the Pacret and Muguet 
software such that a dongle was not required to use the 
software; rather, employees simply used the software after 
the alteration was made.  As such, the actions by GE/PMI 
employees did not amount to circumvention.  Without 
proving GE/PMI actually circumvented the technology, 
MGE does not present a valid DMCA claim.105 
This holding is potentially broader than the others, since it restricts 
the ability of an intellectual property holder to control its 
customers’ aftermarket modifications on the grounds that once a 
technological measure has been bypassed (or “cracked”), 
subsequent uses of the cracked software do not constitute per se 
violations of the DMCA.106  And since GE did not crack the 
software, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, GE was not liable under the 
DMCA.107 
The outcomes of the Chamberlain and Lexmark cases seem fairly 
balanced from a doctrinal and normative standpoint.  MGE UPS 
joins the trend against intellectual property control of customers 
and perhaps extends too far by restricting the statutory power of 
intellectual property holders in DMCA cases to situations in which 
the customer herself cracked the software.  The manufacture of 
generic television remote controls and garage door openers seems 
fairly uncontroversial.  The outright circumvention of security 
dongles adds to this trend but is, to my mind, more controversial. 
Underscoring these courts’ decisions was the fact that each 
plaintiff intellectual property holder attempted to control the 
 
 104. Id.  The Fifth Circuit’s language is not far removed from that of the Ninth 
Circuit’s in MDY finding that such a construction of the DMCA would go beyond 
congressional intent and precedent.  MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 
928, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 105. MGE, 622 F.3d at 366. 
 106. Compare Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a reasonable relationship between the 
circumvention and a protected interest under the Copyright Act of the copyright 
owner), and Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 
550 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring that technological measures must control access to 
a work falling under general copyright protection), with MGE, 622 F.3d at 366 
(finding that subsequent use of a circumvented copyrighted work did not 
constitute a per se copyright infringement), and MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941 
(finding that the Blizzard license agreement contained conditions and covenants, 
and determining that whether violations would constitute copyright infringement 
hinged on whether a condition or covenant was violated, and not an infringement 
nexus). 
 107. MGE, 622 F.3d at 366. 
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businesses that customers could economically interact with—or the 
after-market modifications that customers could make to the 
customers’ own property—merely by claiming that the EULAs 
prohibited customers from purchasing aftermarket add-ons and 
services or making aftermarket modifications.108  From a common 
sense perspective, these decisions check out.  Just as a car 
manufacturer cannot prevent customers from purchasing gold rims 
or a house seller cannot prevent a buyer from remodeling, courts 
have quite sensibly and increasingly held that an attempt by an 
intellectual property holder to seize the aftermarket for 
modifications and aftermarket goods was bad for consumers and 
competition alike. 
Unfortunately, the DMCA made simple cases needlessly 
complex.  Each court had to do some heavy lifting to determine 
that a manufacturer was not privileged to control the add-on or 
aftermarket modification purely by virtue of the fact that they 
claimed a copyright interest in software embedded in the objects 
they sold to the users. 
Each of these court cases represents a slightly different 
approach toward the same goal.  Each court attempted to whittle 
down the seemingly unlimited copyright and DMCA anti-
circumvention rights and did so by requiring limits on the 
application of the DMCA, either to violations actionable under the 
Copyright Act itself or to direct circumventions by the defendant. 
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow this DMCA-centered 
approach in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,109 
and instead focused on the terms of the contract granting the 
license itself.110  Yet the case is not beyond hope.  Properly 
understood, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is even broader than any 
of the prior cases in this trend, since it held that a copyright 
holder’s customers simply did not violate copyright even though 
they breached the express terms of their license agreements.111  The 
 
 108. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530, 531 (restricting the use of non-Lexmark 
toner cartridges); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183, 1187 (prohibiting the use of non-
Chamberlain garage remotes); see also MGE, 622 F.3d at 366–67 (discussing 
assessment of damages for copyright infringement and looking to a hypothetical 
license agreement and what the parties would have agreed to); Band, supra note 
42, at 988 (“And consumers noted with alarm two instances where companies used 
the DMCA to threaten competitors in after-markets . . . .”). 
 109. 629 F.3d at 928. 
 110. Id. at 939–41, 952. 
 111. Id. at 941 (“Although . . . conduct may violate the contractual covenants . . 
. it would not violate any . . . exclusive rights of copyright. . . .  A . . . user violates 
the covenants . . . but does not thereby commit copyright infringement because 
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next part of this article therefore focuses on the close contract 
interpretation approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in MDY. 
III. NEXUS CRYSTALS: CRYSTALLIZING LIMITS ON CONTRACTUAL 
CONTROLS 
The district court in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc.,112 offered a fairly black-letter interpretation of 
the current state of the law, given the Ninth Circuit’s then-extant 
judicial interpretations, by rejecting World of Warcraft (WoW) 
players’ claims of ownership and thus their access to the essential 
step defense.113  The district court then held that players violated 
intellectual property rights each time they turned the game on 
whilst using third-party software that altered the game 
experience.114  The district court thus permitted a software provider 
to limit what aftermarket purchases or modifications a customer 
could make. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in broad 
measure,115 and it is precisely the tension between the Ninth 
Circuit’s newfound understanding that software holders cannot be 
permitted to enforce any term whatsoever as a condition of an 
intellectual property license and its persistent refusal to adopt a 
“nexus test” for the DMCA claims that make the MDY line of cases 
so interesting.116  As the following analysis shows, the Ninth Circuit 
clearly has adopted as a matter of contract construction what it 
rejected as a matter of statutory interpretation:117 companies cannot 
 
[he or she] does not infringe any . . . exclusive rights.”).  
 112. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. (MDY District I), No. CV-06-
2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) 
(finding MDY in breach of the DMCA). 
 113. Id. at *17–18, *52 (“[Granting] summary judgment in favor of Blizzard 
with respect to MDY’s liability for tortious interference . . . and contributory and 
vicarious copyright infringement . . . grant[ing] summary judgment in favor of 
MDY on the portion of the DMCA claim . . . that is based on 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(2) and applies to Blizzard’s game client software code; grant[ing] 
summary judgment in favor of MDY on the unfair competition claim . . . and 
den[ying] summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim . . . .”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. (MDY District II), 
616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (D. Ariz. 2009) (outlining the court’s order and the 
injunction granted following trial on the remaining claims). 
 114. MDY District II, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 965–68. 
 115. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941–42. 
 116. Id. at 939–40, 950, 952. 
 117. Compare id. at 939–41 (outlining the difference between covenants and 
conditions in a license agreement and holding that terms in a license agreement 
unrelated to a protected right under the Copyright Act cannot be enforced under 
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require customers to act in certain social ways that have little to do 
with acts proscribed under the Copyright Act.118  The following 
subparts discuss some facts behind the case, the decisions below, 
and the appellate ruling in detail. 
A. MDY v. Blizzard Entertainment 
This section examines both the factual backdrop of the 
MDY/Blizzard dispute (some of which was incorrectly stated at oral 
argument),119 as well as the district court and Ninth Circuit 
opinions.  The section concludes with an analysis of the contractual 
interpretation holdings of the Ninth Circuit, which represent to me 
a significant and very important narrowing of the potential for 
consumer liability for copyright infringement (and, indirectly, for 
secondary liability for the third-party developers who serve them). 
1. The Players and Some Additional Interesting Facts 
MDY was a fight between gaming juggernaut Blizzard 
Entertainment and MDY, a one-man add-on software business.120  
Blizzard is the creator of video game mega-hits that include Diablo 
I and II, Starcraft, Starcraft II, Warcraft I-III, the upcoming much-
anticipated Diablo III, and the fantastically popular massively 
multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) at issue in the 
MDY case, World of Warcraft (WoW).121  WoW is a virtual world—a 
simulated three-dimensional, persistent, and interactive space in 
which players are represented by avatars (digital representations of 
 
Copyright law), with id. at 942–48 (interpreting the anti-circumvention statutory 
regime and finding a new right of access, yielding copyright protection, created 
under § 1201(a)). 
 118. See id. at 941 (“A player might violate this prohibition . . . by harassing 
another player with unsolicited instant messages. Although this conduct may 
violate the contractual covenants with Blizzard, it would not violate any of 
Blizzard’s exclusive rights of copyright.”). 
 119. Counsel for Blizzard argued that Blizzard never permitted programs such 
as Glider.  Blizzard had, in fact, allowed other third-party programs or “bots.”  See 
World of Warcraft Database, infra note 133. 
 120. Blizzard is well-known for enforcing its intellectual property rights in the 
video game context.  Recent legal battles include the suits of a rival game server, 
WoWscape, Peons4hire (a spamming entity), KeSpa, and MBC Games over the 
emergence of StarCraft as a lucrative sport, to name but a few. 
 121. See Games, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/games/ (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2011); see also Matt Vella, Inside the World of Blizzard, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Aug. 20, 2008,  http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/aug2008 
/id20080820_123140.htm (detailing the success of Blizzard). 
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themselves within the virtual world).122  Blizzard boasts of more 
than 12 million subscribers to the game, each of whom pays a 
monthly subscription fee, and the game brings in over a billion 
dollars annually in revenue.123 
At the center of this case was Blizzard’s add-on policy.  From 
the game’s inception, Blizzard harnessed player creativity by 
encouraging third parties to create add-ons that improved the 
game experience.  However, add-on creators live in a legal grey 
space.  Blizzard reserved, and reserves, the right, via its EULA, to 
decide at any time that an add-on developer’s creation does not 
meet the standards of game play or that a third-party program 
offers some players a unique advantage.124  On more than one 
occasion, Blizzard has even adopted the add-on’s functionality into 
its own interface and then banned or de-incentivized the use of the 
competing add-on.125 
MDY developed a third-party add-on for WoW.  In March 2005, 
Michael Donnelly (the founder, owner, and head of MDY) created 
a popular program called Glider (sometimes WoW-Glider),126 that 
permitted users to automate their avatars.127  It is important to note 
that many virtual worlds have expressly permitted—indeed almost 
required—automated scripting activity on the part of the player.  A 
good example of this was the (at first) popular Star Wars Galaxies 
 
 122. BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 2–10 (2008) (describing what a virtual world is and 
what an avatar is); see also F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A 
Primer, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 13, 15 (Jack M. 
Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) (describing persistent worlds as those 
where “the environment continues to exist and changes over time” despite a given 
player logging off). 
 123. See Press Release, Blizzard Entm’t, World of Warcraft Subscriber Base 
Reaches 12 Million Worldwide (Oct. 7, 2010), http://us.blizzard.com/en-
us/company/press/pressreleases.html?id=2847881; see also Activision Blizzard 
Announces Record First Quarter Financial Results, ACTIVISION (May 9, 2011),  
http://investor.activision.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=575495. 
 124. See, e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http:// 
us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2010). 
 125. See Ndragheta, Blizzard Continues to Steal Ideas, WOWHEAD (June 18, 2009, 
4:22 PM), http://www.wowhead.com/forums&topic=103216/blizzard-continues-
to-steal-ideas.  For a list of these third party add-ons, see World of Warcraft Client 
Patch 4.2: Rage of the Firelands, WORLD OF WARCRAFT: CATACLYSM (June 28, 2011), 
http://us.battle.net/wow/en/game/patch-notes/4-2-0 [hereinafter Rage of the 
Firelands]. 
 126. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 127. Id. at 935–36 (explaining that the program was initially created by 
Michael Donnelly for his personal use and then later sold to other users given its 
wild success). 
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virtual world, in which players were permitted to write elaborate 
automated scripts that would automate the player’s avatar.128 
Glider permitted similar functionality.  Players could instruct 
their avatars to engage in simple, repetitive tasks (like killing the 
same virtual creature over and over again in search of a rare 
item).129  Glider did not permit players to engage in the more 
complex behavior required to actually play the game interactively, 
such as cooperating with other players to go on an adventure 
(called a “raid”).  This was far beyond Glider’s capacity.130  The 
Glider software was of a genre called “botting,” since it turned the 
player’s avatar into a “bot” (short for robot) that acted 
automatically within the game context.131 
Consistent with the then-prevalent industry practice, Blizzard’s 
EULA did not at first ban avatar automation scripts outright.132  The 
line between bots and legitimate add-ons was, and is, impossible to 
seriously maintain.  All add-on computer scripts automate some 
element of the functionality of an avatar.  For example, an early 
and extraordinarily successful add-on was called “Thottbot”—the 
name of which even included “bot”—which automated the 
collection and collation of all objects, creatures, and quests within 
the WoW world.133  Thottbot then automatically indexed and made 
searchable the quests, items, and creatures in the game.  Thus, a 
player who got stuck on a quest or could not find a given creature 
or item could simply look up the answer with Thottbot.  Even 
though Thottbot was, and still remains, a powerful way to 
 
 128. See Kurt D. Squire & Constance A. Steinkuehler, Generating Cyber Culture/s: 
The Case of Star Wars Galaxies, in CYBERLINES 2.0: LANGUAGES AND CULTURES OF THE 
INTERNET 177, 181–83 (Donna Gibbs & Kerri-Lee Krause eds., 2d ed. 2008), 
available at http://inkido.indiana.edu/onlinecom/squire-steinkuehler.pdf. 
 129. See MICHAEL LUMMIS & ED KERN, WORLD OF WARCRAFT MASTER GUIDE 
STRATEGY GUIDE 4 (2d ed. 2006); Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1026 (“Once the 
player instructs Glider, the program works automatically, allowing the player to 
return to his computer later and resume playing with the added experience and 
valuable items Glider earned in the meantime.”). 
 130. Indeed, a primary purpose of the program was to automate simple tasks 
to speed up game play.  See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 935–36.  This is seen in what it 
did: automate simple tasks and leave complex enjoyable tasks, such as raids, to the 
user. 
 131. Id. at 935. 
 132. Id. at 936, 956. 
 133. Indeed, Thottbot is still up and running, although its importance has 
been eclipsed by competitors.  See, e.g., World of Warcraft Database, THOTTBOT, 
http://thottbot.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).  For additional amusement, one 
might search on Thottbot for the description of a Nexus Crystal, a once-important 
virtual object in the WoW economy. 
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circumvent the “natural” progression of exploring the game, it 
remains a tolerated and successful add-on—indeed, a pillar of the 
community134—although now somewhat diminished in importance 
since other, more aggressive indexing sites have become 
available.135  This norm remains firm throughout other popular 
virtual worlds.  For example, in addition to the Star Wars Galaxies 
scripts described above, a core component of the popular virtual 
world Second Life is the so-called “Animation Override”—a process 
by which an avatar is automated by a third-party script and 
performs some act (usually a dance) under the control of the 
computer.136 
Although critical to a proper understanding of the case, these 
background facts were under-addressed or outright misstated at 
oral argument.  For example, in oral argument before the Ninth 
Circuit, counsel for Blizzard incorrectly represented that Blizzard 
had, prior to the launching of Gilder, banned datamining and bot 
algorithms under the EULA.137  One must assume that Blizzard’s 
counsel was simply unaware of Thottbot and the hundreds of other 
botting, automation, and datamining scripts that ran, and continue 
to run, openly and with Blizzard’s blessing within WoW.138 
As might be predicted, MDY’s Glider program proved 
extremely popular and sold over 100,000 copies.139  Blizzard then 
altered its EULA to ban avatar-automation software.140  Blizzard’s 
 
 134. See Thottbot.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo 
/thottbot.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (detailing the web traffic of Thottbot, 
showing that, as of November 24, 2011, it was ranked number 46,771 in the world 
and number 15,381 in the United States); see also Simon Carless, IGE: Inside the 
MMO Trading Machine, GAMASUTRA (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.gamasutra 
.com/view/feature/1837/ige_inside_the_mmo_trading_machine.php (labeling 
Thottbot as a “major item listing site”). 
 135. See Wowhead.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo 
/wowhead.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (listing Wowhead, a comparable 
program to Thottbot, with a traffic rank of 1391 globally and 949 in the United 
States, as of November 24, 2011). 
 136. See SLTutorials.net Tutorial Database, SLTUTORIALS, http://www.sltutorials 
.net/mtree/Animation_%26_More/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 137. Oral Argument at 18:48, MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 
928 (No. 09-15932), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media 
/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000005584 (stating that the Terms of Use in use at the 
time of Glider’s development contained a provision that banned “mining data 
from the game”). 
 138. See Ndragheta, supra note 125; Rage of the Firelands, supra note 125 (listing 
these third-party add-ons). 
 139. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 936. 
 140. Id. at 956 n.22 (“When MDY created Glider in 2005, Blizzard’s ToU 
prohibited the use of ‘cheats’ and ‘unauthorized third-party software’ in 
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position was that avatar automation reduced the player’s incentive 
to play the game as intended and reduced the social interactivity 
important to the game.141  (Never mind that Blizzard’s position was 
incoherent, given its ongoing tolerance of “walk-through” and 
“cheat” tip sites for WoW.)142  MDY believed that Blizzard did not 
have the right to unilaterally alter its EULA to destroy MDY’s 
business model.  MDY therefore altered Glider to be undetectable 
by Blizzard’s sentinel program, Warden.143 
The Warden program was the technological enforcement arm 
of Blizzard’s interpretation of its EULA.  Warden was downloaded 
onto players’ computers and then scanned their RAM for the 
presence of other programs that interacted with the WoW 
executable.144  It is important to note that Warden was not copy 
protection software in any but the most technical of aspects.  
Warden reported its findings to Blizzard, permitting Blizzard to 
ban users of forbidden third-party software from the game.145  
Warden also prevented the WoW executable from running if it 
found the presence of banned third-party executable programs in 
RAM.  Warden was not, however, in any other way a copy 
protection program. 
MDY modified its program to avoid detection by Warden and 
further warned its users via its website that use of Glider was a 
breach of the WoW EULA and thus might result in banning. 
 However, MDY continued to offer Glider and to update and 
modify it so that it would evade detection by Warden. 
2. The District Court Opinions  
The district court opinion (actually consisting of two opinions 
worth mentioning, one granting early summary judgment on some 
claims, and the second following trial on the remaining claims) was 
a clear and straightforward black-letter application of Ninth Circuit 
case law interpreting the Copyright Act, first sale doctrine, essential 
 
connection with WoW.  The meaning of these contractual terms, including 
whether they prohibit bots such as Glider, is ambiguous.”).  MDY argued that 
Blizzard changed its TOU to ban bots directly, but this was not decided given the 
triable issue of fact.  Id. at 956 n.24. 
 141. See id. at 936, 956. 
 142. See, e.g., Ndragheta, supra note 125; (a message board providing walk-
through and cheat information to the public); see also Rage of the Firelands, supra 
note 125 (listing third party add-ons). 
 143. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 936. 
 144. See id. at 942. 
 145. Id. at 936, 942. 
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step defense, and the DMCA.  The court held that following MAI 
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., the license clearly considered 
the anti-botting rule as a condition on which the grant of license 
was based.146  Thus, the district court held, WoW players did not 
own their copies of the game, were not entitled to load the software 
into RAM as an “essential step” of making use of it, and therefore 
committed primary copyright infringement each time that they 
loaded the game in contravention of the terms of the license.147 
Having found primary copyright infringement, the court then 
easily found that MDY had committed secondary copyright 
infringement under both vicarious and contributory liability 
theories.148  Furthermore, the district court granted summary 
judgment on Blizzard’s state law claim of tortious interference with 
contract, on the grounds that under Arizona law MDY’s conduct in 
offering and continuing to offer Glider was wrongful as a matter of 
law.149 
The district court held for MDY on Blizzard’s DMCA § 
1201(a)(2) claim as premised on alleged circumvention of access 
controls protecting a copyrighted work.150  The district court did 
find that MDY violated § 1201(a)(2) with respect to the dynamic 
nonliteral elements of WoW.151  The district court reasoned that 
since players had paid for access to WoW and were in fact able to 
access WoW, the Warden program did not control access to 
WoW.152 
The district court did however deviate from its by-the-book 
black-letter approach to note that there may be a category of 
contractual clauses that are simply outside of the ambit of 
conditions imposed within intellectual property licenses.153  In its 
earlier opinion granting Blizzard summary judgment on secondary 
copyright liability (among other claims), the district court noted a 
difference between clauses that go to a right of copy and those that 
are merely related to proper gameplay: 
The provisions of section 4 thus make clear that although 
users are licensed to play WoW and to use the game client 
 
 146. MDY District I, No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at 
*10–11, *16–19 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008). 
 147. Id. at *31, *32. 
 148. See id. at *32. 
 149. Id. at *51. 
 150. MDY District II, 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, at 964–68 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
 151. Id. at 966–67. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See MDY District I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *12. 
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software while playing, they are not licensed to exercise 
other rights belonging exclusively to Blizzard as the 
copyright holder . . . .  Section 5 of the TOU is different.  
It is titled “Rules of Conduct.” Id. at 4.  The subsections of 
section 5 are titled “Rules Related to Usernames and 
Guild Designations” (§ 5(A)), “Rules Related to ‘Chat’ 
and Interaction With Other Users” (§ 5(B)), and “Rules 
Related to Game Play” (§ 5(C)).154 
As a result, the district court determined that: 
Section 5 thus sets rules for the game, whereas section 4 
establishes limits more clearly designed to preserve 
Blizzard’s copyright interests. The section 5 rules also 
regulate relatively minor matters such as the use of 
celebrity names (§ 5(A)(4)) or offensive language (§ 
5(A)(2)) for WoW characters. Section 5 establishes game 
rules by contract.155 
Thus, even though the district court held that the “no-botting” rule 
was a condition of an intellectual property license rather than a 
contractual condition, the court seemed unsettled by the 
overreaching claims by copyright holders.156  The claim that any 
activity performed during the use of software could be subject to a 
condition of a grant of an intellectual property license seemed even 
to the district court to be one step too far.  The district court noted 
this distinction quite clearly: 
When the EULA and TOU are considered in their 
entirety, the Court concludes that section 4 of the TOU 
establishes limitations on the scope of the license and 
section 5 sets rules of the game as independent contract 
terms [that is, contractual covenants instead of intellectual 
property conditions].157 
Despite its reservations, however, the district court held that WoW 
buyers did not own the software that they bought, that they had no 
right to load the software into RAM unless they complied with every 
condition in the EULA, and that MDY was secondarily liable for any 
copyright infringement that was the result of players playing the 
game while using Glider.158 
 
 154. Id. at *17–18. 
 155. Id. at *18. 
 156. See id. at *20. 
 157. Id. at *18. 
 158. See id. at *18, *31–32, *52. 
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B. The Ninth Circuit Appeal 
Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, it did so 
by adopting and extending the district court's logic regarding the 
enforceability of social control clauses like "do not use third party 
programs."  That is, the Ninth Circuit simply seized on the 
difference identified by the district court between limits on rights 
exercised vis-à-vis intellectual property (the right to make a copy, to 
distribute, to create derivative works, and so on) and purely “social” 
contractual clauses that merely set forth contractual game rules.159  
The Ninth Circuit then expanded on the district court’s own 
reasoning to such an extent that it overruled the district court’s 
overall outcome. 
1. Conditions, Covenants, and Copyrights 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit broadly reversed.  First, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding any copyright 
infringement whatsoever, whether primary (by the player) or 
secondary (on MDY).  The critical question was whether Blizzard 
players, when they used WoW Glider, were directly violating 
intellectual property rights instead of merely violating a contractual 
covenant set forth in the EULA.  (The court used a basic naming 
convention: it termed clauses that limit the scope of an intellectual 
property license “conditions” and other contractual promises 
“covenants.”)160  The court determined, quite correctly, that social 
rules—like “don’t cheat”—were covenants instead of contractual 
conditions.161 
Without such a holding, the court noted, a corporation would 
be free to condition an intellectual property license on any social 
rule whatsoever.  The critical language reads as follows: 
 Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or any software 
copyright holder—could designate any disfavored 
conduct during software use as copyright infringement, by 
purporting to condition the license on the player’s 
abstention from the disfavored conduct.  The rationale 
would be that because the conduct occurs while the 
player’s computer is copying the software code into RAM 
in order for it to run, the violation is copyright 
 
 159. See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939–41 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 160. See id. at 939–40. 
 161. Id. 
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infringement.  This would allow software copyright owners 
far greater rights than Congress has generally conferred 
on copyright owners.162 
It is important to determine whether this holding is a matter 
merely of contract interpretation or contractual construction.  If 
the court is merely advancing a statement of interpretation—that 
is, that although in this case the “don’t bot” requirements were 
contractual covenants and not license conditions, Blizzard may 
simply rewrite the contract to make them such—the MDY case will 
not lead to much.163  There are some cases like this, where a court 
lets a consumer win on a narrow contractual ground.164  The losing 
corporation then merely changes its contract language (which it 
reserves the right to do unilaterally) and the case is a flash in the 
pan—one customer wins but the case sets no useful precedent for 
the protection of consumers more broadly.165 
However, if the MDY court’s decision that there was no 
copyright infringement on behalf of WoW players stands for 
something more than bare contractual interpretation, then 
perhaps the case is not a flash in the pan.166  At issue is whether, 
going forward, Blizzard may simply amend its TOU and EULA to 
expressly state that non-use of bots is a condition of the grant of the 
intellectual property license.  The fighting question is whether that 
clear statement would satisfy the Ninth Circuit or other federal 
 
 162. Id. at 941. 
 163. Band, supra note 42 at 987 (“Only time will tell whether these holdings 
will be limited to their specific facts, or will evolve into rules of more general 
applicability.”). 
 164. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (remanding the case to the lower courts to determine whether the contract 
was unenforceable and directing them to find the contract unenforceable if they 
found it unconscionable); Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 400 
(N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding the terms of the contract unenforceable as they were 
illusory). 
 165. This problem is expressed more broadly in the power imbalance of one-
time participants and repeat players.  Individuals (for example customers) are the 
quintessential one-shot players.  In the gaming context, a game is purchased once 
(same with expansion packs).  The repeat player (for example Blizzard) has 
greater knowledge, power, and access to the legal system.  For a broad treatment 
of this, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053023; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come 
out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999). 
 166. If it is not just a matter of a single contractual interpretation, then it can 
result in a rule of general applicability and act as a tool to counteract copyright 
creep. 
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courts treating MDY as persuasive authority or whether the court’s 
language here demonstrates something more: a limit on the use of 
contractual clauses to control behavior that is, at best, tangentially 
related to rights granted under the Copyright Act. 
The language of the opinion quoted above is instructive in 
addressing this question.  The court appears to hold that a 
contractual clause unrelated to a core right granted under § 106 of 
the Copyright Act cannot be a condition of an intellectual property 
license.167  This holding, clear on its face, in fact undermines the 
Ninth Circuit’s adherence to MAI, which has been roundly 
criticized in the academic legal literature.168  Here is why: the MDY 
court requires that there be a nexus between the clause in the 
contract and the exercise of some right granted under § 106.169 
 The court’s common-sense ruling was that Warden was not a copy-
protection program: it sought to prevent the use of unauthorized 
add-ons, not to prevent copying of the WoW executable.  Indeed, 
Blizzard has little interest in preventing the copying of the WoW 
executable and in fact hands it out for free.170  Since users must pay 
for an account and a subscription, Blizzard makes its money not 
from selling the software client but from the account subscription 
fees.171  Thus, there are no copy protections on Blizzard clients—
one can simply download the latest client for free from the 
Internet.  Of course, in order to play the game one must set up an 
account and a subscription. 
But this common sense analysis flies straight in the face of 
MAI’s insane decision that a copy of software is made every time a 
 
 167. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941. 
 168. The legal academic response to MAI has been deeply negative.  See 
Perzanowski, supra note 40, at 1075 (detailing the two main criticisms, interpretive 
failings and policy considerations, of the RAM copy doctrine); see, e.g., Band, supra 
note 42; Carver, supra note 20, at 1954 (“To determine whether title to a copy has 
been transferred, courts should look to whether the transferee has a right of 
perpetual possession of the copy. This is the key factor that distinguishes sales and 
gifts on the one hand, and leases and lending on the other.”); Shikowitz, supra 
note 42 (detailing the two main criticisms, interpretive failings and policy 
considerations, of the RAM copy doctrine); Von Lohmann, supra note 42.  
 169. Von Lohmann, supra note 42. 
 170. Sign up for the Free World of Warcraft Starter Edition, BATTLE.NET, 
https://us.battle.net/account/creation/wow/signup/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) 
(offering new users the opportunity to play the first twenty WoW levels for free). 
 171. See Subscription Options, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/support 
/article.xml?locale=en_US&articleId=21450&pageNumber=1&searchQuery=paym
ent (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (offering month-to-month, three month, and six 
month subscriptions). 
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computer loads software from the hard disk into RAM.172 
 Proponents of Blizzard’s position in the MDY case must have 
suffered a moment of surreality in reading the Ninth Circuit 
opinion.  The court noted that absent its holding to the contrary, a 
copyright holder “could designate any disfavored conduct during 
software use as copyright infringement” and required there to be a 
nexus between any such clause and a right granted by § 106.173 
 That right would be, in the Blizzard proponent’s eyes, the core 
right to make copies under the Copyright Act.  As the court 
explained: “The rationale would be that because the conduct 
occurs while the player’s computer is copying the software code 
into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright 
infringement.  This would allow software copyright owners far 
greater rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright 
owners.”174 
This is an innovative challenge to the copyright status quo. 
 The court first requires a nexus between a contractual clause and a 
right protected under the Copyright Act.175  The court then implies 
that, as a matter of law, the copy created by copying the software 
from hard drive to RAM does not satisfy this requirement.176  This is 
frankly difficult reasoning to square with the court’s upholding of 
MAI and the RAM copy doctrine in its discussions of ownership, 
first sale, and the essential step defense.  In short, the court states 
that it supports the RAM copy doctrine while simultaneously 
holding that MAI RAM copies do not satisfy the nexus requirement 
of tying the contractual clause to a right granted by the Copyright 
Act.177 
Thus, although MDY has been criticized in legal academic 
literature as just another application of the RAM copy doctrine, 
bad licensee/ownership intuitions, and the failure of the First Sale 
doctrine online,178 it appears to me to offer instead a real chance 
for pro-consumer doctrines to crystallize even in the Ninth Circuit, 
 
 172. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“[W]e hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under 
the Copyright Act.”). 
 173. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 954. 
 177. See id. at 938, 941 (reiterating the RAM copy doctrine and later rejecting 
that it can tie a contractual clause to a right under the Copyright Act as it would go 
against congressional intent under copyright). 
 178. See Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1035–53. 
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the heart of the MAI doctrine.179  The MDY holding directly 
undermines MAI by holding that a rule, unrelated to a right 
protected by copyright, cannot be redrafted so as to become a 
condition on a grant of an intellectual property license.  Doing so, 
the court plainly states, would be beyond the power granted to 
copyright holders by Congress.180  This removes corporations’ 
greatest tool in denying legal rights to consumers: the power, even 
in a losing case, to simply redraft the contract so that it clearly (and 
even more abusively) restates in the corporation’s favor whatever 
clause the court had interpreted in the case. 
The court’s holding in MDY constitutes, if not a functional 
overturning of MAI, a practical retrenchment and severe narrowing 
of the grounds on which consumers can be found liable for 
copyright infringement for performing actions that are outside of 
the scope of their EULAs.  Further, this holding offers some serious 
hope to third-party providers of software that they will not be liable 
for copyright infringement for the actions of their customers that 
are in contravention of a contract the third-party software provider 
may not even be aware of. 
The holding is even more exciting for gamers and third-party 
software providers because it has ramifications for the DMCA.  
First, I should reiterate that for § 1201(a) claims, the Ninth Circuit 
in MDY rejected a nexus requirement and held that access to 
copyrighted material can be conditioned on any requirement (e.g., 
you must wear hot pink while logging in) that the copyright holder 
deems appropriate, expedient, or even hilarious.181  But the court’s 
 
 179. The Ninth Circuit is where MAI and its progeny were decided.  See, e.g., 
Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 769 (9th Cir. 2006).  
Other circuits have approached the issue of copies in RAM differently.  See, e.g., 
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–29 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding that both the Copyright Act’s embodiment and durational requirements 
need to be met in order for a data stream to be fixed).  The Second Circuit’s 
decision presented a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in that it looked at the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in MAI that RAM copies are made to where they can be 
made.  Id. at 128. 
 180. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941. 
 181. See id. at 952 (“[W]e conclude that a fair reading of the statute . . . 
indicates that Congress created a distinct anti-circumvention right under § 
1201(a) without an infringement nexus requirement.”).  When an EULA becomes 
a technological measure, a contract can then condition access on its terms, say 
wearing a specific color or refraining from certain behavior in order to gain 
access, and such access is also agreement to the terms.  See ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing that U.C.C. § 2-204(1) 
provides for different formations of contracts, such as a prompt on a computer 
screen, which can prevent access).  “ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer 
40
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holding that WoW players do not commit any intellectual property 
infringement whatsoever when they break the EULA’s “play nice” 
rules does in fact limit the ability of copyright holders to bring 
some claims under the DMCA.182  Unlike § 1201(a), which the 
court held applies to any condition placed on access to works 
protected under the Copyright Act,183 § 1201(b) directly references 
technological measures that protect a right of a copyright holder 
under the Act.184 
The court took this to mean that while § 1201(a) access can be 
conditioned on any condition the copyright holder might dream 
up, § 1201(b) copy protection measures must be targeted at 
protecting a right protected under the Act.185  And under the same 
analysis, the court determined that there was no nexus between a 
clause requiring players not to cheat in a game and any right 
granted under § 106 of the Copyright Act.186  The MDY court 
likewise held that § 1201(b) claims could not be brought when 
players breach licenses because, again, the Warden program was 
not a copy protection program and did not protect any right 
granted to the copyright holder under the Act.187 
In short, only Blizzard’s § 1201(a) claims remain (besides the 
state law interference with contract claims).  This is important 
because although the Ninth Circuit decided that the Warden 
program “allowed access” to a protected work, that reasoning is 
decidedly both in the minority and against the common sense 
reading of the statute as explained in Lexmark and Chamberlain.188  
 
would accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license 
at leisure.  This Zeidenberg did.  He had no choice, because the software splashed 
the license on the screen and would not let him proceed without indicating 
acceptance.”  Id.  If you fail to click agree and still use the software, then you have 
circumvented a technological measure.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) 
(“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 182. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941. 
 183. Id. at 944. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 945–46. 
 186. Id at 940–41. 
 187. Id. at 954–55. 
 188. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 528, 
533, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the relationships between rights under the 
Copyright Act and the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, and determining 
that the anti-circumvention provisions do not grant a new right); Chamberlain 
Grp., Inc. v. Skyline Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192–1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(interpreting the provisions of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, looking 
to the Copyright Act and congressional intent, and finding that the anti-
circumvention provisions created a new cause of action and not a new property 
41
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The court in MDY correctly stated that a customer does not gain 
access to the WoW component, its service, or any of its elements, 
through the Warden program.189  The customer gains access to the 
copyrighted works in all of their forms by buying a copy of the 
game.190  This argument has generally done quite well in courts 
nationwide,191 and thus the last ground for DMCA liability in the 
Ninth Circuit hangs by a fairly slender jurisprudential thread. 
2. Antitrust and Copyright Misuse 
I have focused here on what there is to celebrate in the MDY 
decision.  This is because the response to the case has been 
generally critical—a “glass half empty” approach.192  There is 
certainly much about the case to criticize.  The court continues the 
mistaken Ninth Circuit approach in MAI and Wall Data with respect 
to first sale and essential step analyses.193  These deprive buyers of 
software from the basic protections of ownership that Congress 
intended to extend to software purchasers. 
Similarly, there is much to criticize in the Ninth Circuit’s 
treatment of copyright misuse and antitrust issues in the case.  The 
Ninth Circuit seems to have misunderstood its own precedent and 
the facts of the current case.  MDY’s argument on appeal was that 
Blizzard was misusing its state-granted copyright monopoly to 
extend its control to the aftermarket for third-party 
modifications.194  The Ninth Circuit inexplicably determined that 
MDY had not raised issues of fact regarding Blizzard’s actions 
because, the court noted, Blizzard was not using its copyright 
 
right where circumvention is infringement and copyright protection would be 
implicated). 
 189. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 953. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.; see, e.g., Lexmark, 387 F. 3d at 546 (“It is not Lexmark’s authentication 
sequence that ‘controls access’ to the Printer Engine Program . . . . It is the 
purchase of a Lexmark printer that allows ‘access’ to the program.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1015–16; Corynne McSherry, A Mixed 
Ninth Circuit Ruling in MDY v. Blizzard: WoW Buyers Are Not Owners—But Glider Users 
Are Not Copyright Infringers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2010), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/12/mixed-ninth-circuit-ruling-mdy-v-blizzard-
wow; Venkat & Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit’s Mixed Opinion in Glider/WoW Bot 
Case—MDY Industries v. Blizzard, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2010, 9:41 
AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/12/messy_follow_up.htm. 
 193. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 938–39 (outlining that defenses based on 
ownership, such as essential step, are not available if a user licenses the software 
instead of owning it). 
 194. Id. at 941. 
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control to drive out another maker of an MMORPG.195  This is 
simply wrong because it focuses on the primary market rather than 
the aftermarket.  A well-known, relevant precedent, Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Services, held that an industry-dominating 
camera manufacturer could not leverage its position in the camera 
market to take over the aftermarket for film.196  Kodak was not 
using its market position to control the camera market but to 
extend its control into the aftermarket.197  Similarly, the Chamberlain 
and Lexmark courts, although they did not base their holdings on 
antitrust or anticompetition, were clearly concerned about 
permitting a garage door maker to leverage its position into control 
of the generic remote control market198 or permitting a printer 
manufacturer to leverage its market position into control over the 
printer cartridge market.199  Even MAI itself was superseded in its 
actual, narrow holding by Congress in the DMCA out of a concern 
that copyright holders would seize control of the aftermarket for 
repairs or computer servicing.200  All of these cases have been about 
 
 195. Id. at 951, 957. 
 196. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 452–53 
(1992). 
 197. Id. at 481–82 (identifying the following two separate markets affected by 
Kodak: products and service).  “Kodak . . . contends that, as a matter of law, a 
single brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market under the 
Sherman Act. We disagree. The relevant market for antitrust purposes is 
determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners.”  Id. 
 198. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing Chamberlain’s arguments as effectively granting 
control of aftermarkets based upon the addition of a “single copyrighted sentence 
or software fragment to its product”).  “Chamberlain’s construction of the DMCA 
would allow virtually any company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket 
monopolies—a practice that both the antitrust laws . . . and the doctrine of 
copyright misuse . . . normally prohibit.”  Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 
455; Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 
2003)).  The court rejects this based on the doctrine of fair use as Chamberlain’s 
DMCA construction would allow two parties to contract around the fair use right 
“through a combination of contractual terms and technological measures, to 
repeal the fair use doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted work.”  Id. at 
1202. 
 199. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 
551 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring) (“Automobile manufacturers, for 
example, could control the entire market of replacement parts for their vehicles 
by including lock-out chips. Congress did not intend to allow the DMCA to be 
used offensively in this manner, but rather only sought to reach those who 
circumvented protective measures ‘for the purpose’ of pirating works protected by 
the copyright statute.”). 
 200. See Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Computer Programs, 17 U.S.C. § 
117(c) (2006) (creating an exemption from infringement for computer repair 
and maintenance). 
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a manufacturer seeking to control the aftermarket, not the 
manufacturer’s primary market.  Thus, for the court to have held 
MDY’s copyright misuse and antitrust claims inactionable as a 
matter of law seems to be an amateur mistake. 
But the court’s error is not merely one of ignoring or 
misstating precedent.  It is a particularly dangerous mistake given 
Blizzard’s history.201  Blizzard has in fact used its power over its 
copyrights in its video games to leverage control over extremely 
different industries.202  One case in point is Blizzard’s takeover of 
the electronic sports market.  Blizzard’s original StarCraft game was 
not only enjoyable to play, but enjoyable to watch.  Organizations 
in other countries began to develop StarCraft (and the StarCraft 
sequel, Brood War) into an electronic sport (e-sport).  The Korean 
Electronic Sports Association (KeSPA) developed StarCraft 
sportscasting into a mega-hit industry with professional leagues of 
players and prime time broadcasting of matches.203 
However, once this market for e-sports was sufficiently 
developed, Blizzard took it over.  It revoked KeSPA’s licensing 
approval on the grounds that KeSPA had permitted broadcast of 
Blizzard’s intellectual property without proper permission; 
arranged licenses with a different, more pliable set of 
organizations; and set out to take the e-sport global with the release 
 
 201. Blizzard does not hesitate to enforce the terms of its agreements (EULAs 
and TOU).  See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (seeking to enforce a “no cheating” provision in a license agreement 
and TOU, and essentially driving a company out of business); Davidson & Assocs., 
Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. 
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 633–37 (8th Cir. 2005) (suing a 
company for creation of a rival online forum to play Blizzard games for free in 
violation of copyright and license agreement terms); Consent Permanent 
Injunction at 2, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. 07-589 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2007), available at http://virtuallyblind.com/files/Peons 
_Injunction.pdf (dealing with a suit over what Blizzard found to be cheating by a 
company that facilitated enhanced gold farming in WoW). 
 202. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939; Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633–37.  Blizzard 
exercised its legal muscle to control the aftermarket in add-on programs and to 
eliminate spamming on in-game chatting by preventing Peons4hire from 
continuing to do business.  See Consent Permanent Injunction, supra note 201, at 
2; see also Don Southerton, Legal Battle—Korea’s MBC Game vs. Blizzard 
Entertainment’s StarCraft, KOREA LEGAL.ORG (Dec. 5, 2010), http:// 
www.koreaexpertwitness.com/blog/tag/blizzard-entertainment/ (discussing the 
popularity of StarCraft in South Korea, the league, its history, and the emerging 
legal battle over control of the emerging lucrative market of StarCraft as a 
professional sport). 
 203. See Southerton, supra note 202. 
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of the equally popular StarCraft II title.204  Thus, Blizzard has a 
proven track record of waiting to see how markets for their 
products develop, including industries and aftermarket uses that 
are quite different from what Blizzard originally anticipated, and 
then taking the market over.  It is as if the inventor of baseball 
suddenly laid claim to the World Series or if the inventor of 
basketball suddenly revoked the ability of the NBA to broadcast 
games or even film backyard pickup games of HORSE. 
The same is true of the aftermarket add-on market.  Blizzard 
has routinely taken the best add-ons—for example, CTRaid or the 
various aggression meters used to measure which party member a 
monster would attack next—and incorporated them into Blizzard’s 
own WoW interface.205  The new ruling went against the Ninth 
Circuit’s prior decision.  Blizzard uses the add-on market as a test 
bed for its UI and incorporates the most successful add-ons into its 
interface.206  Given this background and history, especially 
Blizzard’s history of encouraging interface add-on innovation, and 
then retracting rights to those innovations for its own purposes, the 
court should have looked more deeply at the anticompetition and 
copyright misuse claims in this case. 
C. Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control 
In this section, I offer an analysis of the contractual holdings of 
MDY in light of the broader issues at stake in the arena of 
contractual control of online communities.207 
There are several competing ways to view the cases.  One 
approach, described earlier, is to lump together all cases that have 
a pro-DMCA bent and separate them all from those that seem to be 
trying to limit the ambit of the DMCA.  Broadly, the pro-DMCA 
cases have the easier statutory reading job and the harder job 
reconciling the statutory language with Congress’s stated intention 
not to negatively impact fair use or imbalance copyright rights.208  
 
 204. Id. 
 205. See, e.g., Yong Ming Kow & Bonnie Nardi, Who Owns the Mods?, FIRST 
MONDAY (May 3, 2010), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index 
.php/fm/article/view/2971/2529; Matthew McCurely, Addon Spotlight: Blizzard’s 
Built-in Raid Profiles, WOW INSIDER (July 7, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
http://wow.joystiq.com/2011/07/07/addon-spotlight-blizzards-built-in-raid-
profiles/#continued.  
 206. Patch 1.3.5 Now Available on PTR, STARCRAFT II: WINGS OF LIBERTY (July 13, 
2011), http://us.battle.net/sc2/en/blog/2983578#blog. 
 207. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939–41. 
 208. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006). 
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The anti-DMCA cases have the harder statutory job but an easier 
time explaining why the entire market for generic television 
remote controls should not disappear because of some incautious 
statutory wording.  This is the familiar sorting of cases and I raise it 
because I think that it is not as good of a sorting mechanism as the 
approach I outline here. 
It may be better to view the law unfolding in this area as courts 
contributing tools to a toolbox rather than as courts taking sides in 
a game of backyard football with the DMCA as a scrimmage line.  
In the broader context, courts have been groping for tools to 
control significant overreaches in online contracts, especially mass-
market consumer contracts that purport to govern significant 
portions of users’ everyday lives or effect mass transfers of 
consumers’ intellectual property interests.209  For example, one can 
easily imagine a court grasping at contractual straws to invalidate 
an agreement between Microsoft and its users that transfers to 
Microsoft the IP rights in any creative works written with Microsoft 
Word or purports to ban users from using any non-approved third-
party programs in conjunction with a Microsoft operating system. 
 This is of course what the Blizzard EULA does, and it is only the 
fact that Microsoft has a passé reputation for antitrust violations—
and Blizzard does not yet—that keeps the Blizzard EULA alive. 
The broader context has seen the revival of nearly-defunct 
contract doctrines, such as adhesion, unconscionability, 
illusoriness, and now the distinction between covenants and 
conditions,210 as slowly coalescing limits on contractual 
overreaching online.  These doctrines sometimes become stronger 
than their old common-law origins.  For example, recent cases have 
held that online TOUs that reserve the right to unilaterally change 
the agreement are illusory, since the service provider in fact is 
making no promises.211  Similarly, in a well-known 2007 decision, 
 
 209. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 938–41 (stating the court’s approach using 
conditions and covenants and a nexus between any such condition and a right 
granted by § 106); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1110–12 (9th Cir. 
2010) (establishing a three point framework to determine if a purchaser of 
software is an owner or licensee); see also Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006) (illustrating the same framework as 
Vernor). 
 210. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939. 
 211. See Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399 (N.D. Tex. 2009) 
(“[T]here is nothing in the Terms and Conditions that prevents Blockbuster from 
unilaterally changing any part of the contract other than providing that such 
changes will not take effect until posted on the website.”); Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 607–08 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the TOUs governing 
a virtual world—Second Life—were unconscionable in part 
because the game creator reserved to itself the unilateral right to 
ban players and expropriate all of their virtual property.212 
This is the context in which MDY is properly situated: one in 
which courts have increasingly gotten questions of online contract 
right but have persisted in misinterpreting Copyright Act 
congressional protections of consumers against overreaching by 
copyright holders.  MDY is the latest in this series of cases.  The 
Ninth Circuit persists in refusing first sale and essential step rights 
to consumers on the shaky legal grounds that a customer who buys 
software in fact buys nothing other than a license right which may 
be taken away at any time and the scope of which may be 
unilaterally altered by the copyright holder on a whim. 
Consistent with the broader trend in Internet law, what the 
Ninth Circuit gets quite wrong as a matter of intellectual property 
law, it gets right as a matter of contractual interpretation.213  The 
Ninth Circuit noted that these sorts of use restrictions cannot be 
enforced as intellectual property conditions unrelated to the 
exercise of any right protected under the Copyright Act.214  This is a 
curious holding, given Ninth Circuit precedent in MAI and Wall 
Data stating that any copying of the software into RAM is a copy 
and thus any condition that governs the terms under which that 
RAM copy may be made is properly deemed a condition of the 
license.215  The Ninth Circuit has therefore indeed adopted a nexus 
requirement—between a clause of a contract purporting to be a 
condition and some right granted under the Copyright Act—and 
has held that a RAM copy cannot satisfy that requirement.  There is 
no other way to make sense of the court’s holding. 
 
 212. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595–97, 608–10. 
 213. Compare MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939–41 (outlining the difference 
between covenants and conditions in a license agreement, and explaining that 
terms in a license agreement unrelated to a protected right under the Copyright 
Act can’t be enforced under copyright law), with id. at 942–48 (interpreting the 
anti-circumvention statutory regime and finding a new right of access, yielding 
copyright protection, created under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)). 
 214. Id. at 940–42. 
 215. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (finding that a copy made by a licensee is a violation of the license 
agreement and is also a copyright infringement); supra note 16 and accompanying 
text (discussing RAM copy doctrine); see also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that defendant was a licensee 
of the software and therefore infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by copying the 
software and installing it on several computers in violation of the license 
agreement). 
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It is, of course, entirely possible that the Ninth Circuit will 
lapse back into a rote acceptance of the characterization of the 
license itself of what constitutes a covenant and what constitutes a 
condition.  If that were the case, MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc. would be merely a flash in the pan, a one-shot 
interpretation of a contract that would be promptly papered over 
by making the contractual clause at issue expressly a condition of 
the grant of the license.  But I do not think that is the likely or the 
proper reading of the case.  First, Blizzard’s license did purport to 
condition the grant of the license on compliance with all terms in 
the EULA and TOU.216  The court found that that express language 
was not enough, given the lack of a nexus between the right 
claimed (the right to control consumers’ ability to do business with 
other software providers) and the exercise of any right granted 
under the Copyright Act.217 
Equally important, I do not think the Ninth Circuit will shy 
away from looking to the realities of a transaction and past the 
formal characterization of the license agreement.  On the same day 
that the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in MDY Industries, LLC v. 
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. the same panel heard another first sale 
case, Vernor v. Autodesk.218  The court asked in Vernor whether a 
buyer of software who purchases in contravention of the seller’s 
promise to the copyright holder not to sell may then resell the 
software free and clear on eBay.  Although that case also denied the 
buyer any first sale rights and denied the eventual downstream 
purchaser any essential step defense, Vernor did set out a three-
prong test for the determination of first sale.219  The court treated 
the characterization of the transaction as a license as only the 
beginning of the inquiry.220  Thus, the growing trend, even where 
courts are giving copyright holders the most leeway, is to look to 
the underlying realities of the transaction and not give dispositive 
weight to the characterization of the agreement itself.221 
 
 216. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 938–39. 
 217. Id. at 940–41. 
 218. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 219. Id. at 1111–12. 
 220. Id. at 1112–15 (addressing policy implications and four additional 
arguments advanced by Vernor, notably the circuit split and the underlying 
economic realities of the transaction, which were all rejected). 
 221. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169–72 (W.D. Wash. 
2008) (discussing the precedent in Wise and contrary results in subsequent Ninth 
Circuit decisions and the MAI Trio which gave dispositive weight to agreements 
and deciding in line with Wise).  “Taking direction solely from Wise, the court . . . 
concludes that the transfer . . . was a sale.”  Id. at 1170–72.  The court based this 
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There is another challenge to my analysis based on Vernor that 
is worth noting.  Vernor was an after-market control.222  It required 
the buyer of Autodesk software not to resell that software.223  This 
seems to run directly counter to Lexmark and Chamberlain.  Thus, a 
hypothetical interlocutor might ask: “How is it possible to align—as 
I do—MDY with Chamberlain and Lexmark when it is so very clear 
that the Ninth Circuit intends to keep rubber-stamping copyright 
holders’ use of copyright powers to extract control over secondary 
markets (as did Autodesk when it shut down Vernor’s eBay resales of 
the AutoCAD software)?” 
I have three answers.  First, the Ninth Circuit has since further 
tacked back toward limiting direct aftermarket resale control by 
reaffirming the first sale doctrine’s application to digital music 
stored on CDs in UMG v. Augusto.224  That case held that a “Not for 
Sale” license slapped onto promotional music CDs could not 
prevent their eventual resale by the recipients.225  Second, the 
aftermarket controls in Autodesk were different from those in MDY, 
Chamberlain, and Lexmark.  It’s an easy distinction to miss—in fact 
the MDY court itself missed it and, thus, gave the anticompetition 
claims in the case short shrift.  Autodesk deals with the ability of a 
copyright holder to control aftermarket sales of its own copyrighted 
material.  Lexmark, Chamberlain, and MDY deal with the attempt by a 
copyright holder to wipe out someone else’s business plan based on 
interoperability: a generic garage door opener that works with your 
garage, a refilled printer cartridge that works with your printer, or a 
software add-on that works with your video game.  Thus, the case 
that stands most in opposition to Lexmark, Chamberlain, and MDY in 
this case would not be Vernor; rather, it would be Blizzard 
 
determination on the underlying facts of the transaction and the terms in the 
agreements.  Id.; see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 
1977) (identifying the license given but then proceeding to analyze the 
transactions to determine if any of them may be considered sales for the purpose 
of the first sale doctrine); Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1016–17 (describing Ninth 
Circuit precedent in Wise and Vernor and their focus on the underlying economic 
realities—instead of relying upon a software provider’s EULA exclusively—of a 
software purchase and whether it leads to a license or ownership).  
 222. See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111–12 (stating that Autodesk reserved title to 
release fourteen copies and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions).  
These transfer and use restrictions effectively control the aftermarket by limiting 
the purchase to a license and restricting what the user may do. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding on first sale grounds that license purporting to restrict use of CDs to 
promotional use only did not prohibit recipients from selling the CDs). 
 225. Id. at 1182–83. 
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Entertainment’s own prior victory over creators of an interoperable 
server for the fabulously successful Starcraft game, as set out in 
Davidson & Associates v. Internet Gateway,226 better known below (and 
more descriptively titled) as Blizzard Entertainment v. BnetD.227 
But the most important distinction of all is the cleanest and 
the clearest.  The district and circuit courts in MDY agreed that 
certain kinds of contractual rules—social rules regarding how to 
behave and play the game—were not enforceable as copyright 
infringements but merely as breaches of contract.  The district 
court and Ninth Circuit came to different conclusions merely 
because they differed in their characterization of whether a ban on 
“botting” was a social rule governing game play or an intellectual 
property condition controlling the conditions under which a copy 
of the software (again, from hard disk into RAM) could be made. 
To the software industry, this difference between social rule 
and intellectual property use restriction might not matter much; 
but the difference matters more to consumers.  Online 
communities are heavily regulated by these kinds of social rules.  As 
noted above, Facebook’s TOU restrict what citizens can and cannot 
say via one of the (currently) top communications media.228  The 
public has stopped communicating on public street corners or via 
content-neutral telephone lines.  More people use Facebook to 
communicate—and more people therefore communicate under 
Facebook’s rules—than use e-mail.229  These rules need to be 
pruned back to protect consumers, to protect communications, 
and to protect communities. 
It is precisely this distinction that both the district court below 
and the Ninth Circuit noted.  There is a difference in kind between 
rules like “don’t resell” and rules like “don’t cheat.”  Courts may 
vacillate over enforcing “don’t resell,” but the tide appears to be 
turning against rules like “don’t cheat” or “don’t discuss certain 
topics using our service.”  Companies can, of course, enforce these 
 
 226. See Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 
1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
 227. Davidson & Associates, Inc. is now Blizzard and Internet Gateway was the 
creator of BnetD. 
 228. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, para. (5)(2) (Apr. 26, 
2011), http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (“We can remove any content 
or information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement.”). 
 229. See Facebook More Popular than E-mail, Study Shows, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 13, 
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,509033,00.html (explaining that 
networking sites, of which Facebook is the most popular, account for ten percent 
of time spent online, which is greater than e-mail). 
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rules as individual breaches of contract but decreasingly as 
infringements upon copyright. 
There is one final potential challenge to the lens through 
which I view these cases.  This competing approach simply sorts the 
cases according to whether they involve physical objects or 
intangible intellectual property.  So, interoperable garage door 
openers and printer cartridges are fine; interoperable game servers 
and botting add-ons are not.  The problem with this approach is 
that it turns on a distinction with utterly no difference.230  There is 
little difference between an MP3 on a CD and an MP3 on a 
computer hard drive.  Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrates the 
tensions in these cases.  The Ninth Circuit recently enforced after-
market controls on eBay sales of AutoCAD CDs (in Vernor) but 
refused to enforce after-market controls on sales of promotional 
music CDs (in Augusto).231  One kind of CD is just as tangible as the 
other. 
Instead of turning on tangibility, the cases may instead turn on 
the kind of control that the copyright holder was trying to assert 
and what the copyright holder offered in return.  In Vernor, 
Autodesk offered its customer a discounted ability to upgrade to 
new software in return for the promise not to sell the old software.  
That is not a bad trade.  On the other hand, in UMG v. Augusto, 
one gets the sense that the court does not approve of “drive-by” 
contracting in which a music promoter sends out the CDs with 
license terms attached and the recipient gets nothing in return nor 
has any say in the matter. 
The question for purposes of the current analysis is whether 
the mass-market video game contract at issue in MDY is more like 
the upgrade contract in Vernor or the drive-by contract of adhesion 
in Augusto.  Reasonable minds may differ on that question while 
still reaching consensus that the CDs in Augusto were no more 
intrinsically tangible than were the CDs in Vernor.  The sorting of 
cases along a tangibility-intangibility axis lacks explanatory power. 
Each of these considerations militates, I believe, against the 
MDY holding by acting as a mere flash in the pan or merely 
chalking the case up as another win for the copy-control camp.  Of 
course, MDY is one case.  But it is important not to underestimate 
 
 230. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The 
(Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2007); see also Joshua A.T. 
Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005). 
 231. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
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the power of the holding.  Few academics would miss the 
significance of a case severely limiting Microsoft’s or Google’s 
power to constrain its consumers’ everyday lives via software license 
agreements.  Video games still suffer when it comes to being taken 
seriously, although they have been a larger industry than 
Hollywood for the better part of a decade.232  Blizzard is a major 
player in video game circles and has become a recognized name in 
legal circles as well.  Under its prior name of Davidson & Associates, 
Blizzard has previously set important precedent on the interaction 
of EULAs and the DMCA.233  A holding that Blizzard customers did 
not commit any kind of copyright infringement whatsoever when 
they contravened express terms of the WoW EULA not only lifts the 
cloud of copyright infringement from over the heads of the 11–12 
million players of WoW, but also substantially impacts the balance 
of power between international corporations and hundreds of 
millions of video game players worldwide. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The MDY court held that between 11 and 12 million WoW 
players cannot be held liable for copyright infringement if they 
violate the terms of Blizzard’s EULA because they would merely 
violate a contractual covenant not a condition of an intellectual 
property license.  The legal world has, in response, largely 
shrugged because the case seems to align with the depressing run 
of cases that run roughshod over the first sale doctrine and 
essential step defense. 
This article has attempted to demonstrate the value of an 
alternative approach.  It has suggested a shift in focus toward 
 
 232. See Tom Chatfield, Videogames Now Outperform Hollywood Movies, 
THEGUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology 
/gamesblog/2009/sep/27/videogames-hollywood (noting that in Britain in 2008, 
gaming eclipsed combined sales of DVD and music and was over four times the 
cinema box office take home, and further noting the recognition that gaming has 
received as an industry while concerns of its recognition as a legitimate medium 
remain).  “A game, it’s understood, can look spectacular, but it will have little to 
offer its audience in the way of values, insights or craftsmanship.”  Id; see also 
FACTBOX-Initial Sales of Video Games vs. Movie Blockbusters, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2009, 
3:01 pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/videogames 
-idUSN1032711620091110 (comparing side-by-side sales of videogames and movies 
in the United States with movies slightly ahead). 
 233. See Davidson & Assocs, v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that a software developer gave up its fair use right to reverse engineer software for 
interoperability purposes when an employee clicked “I Agree” on a Blizzard 
EULA). 
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contract interpretation as an alternative and equally viable means 
for shielding consumers from overreaching mass-market contracts. 
 This contractual interpretation approach appears to have been 
persuasive to a court that otherwise continues to lead the charge in 
denying Copyright Act protections to consumers.  Further, the 
contract approach led the Ninth Circuit to seriously undermine 
MAI and its progeny through its assertion that a contractual clause 
must both be expressly stated as a condition and must have a nexus 
with the assertion of some right protected under the Copyright Act 
in order to act as a condition on an intellectual property license.  
Although the Ninth Circuit splits from the Federal and Sixth 
Circuits by holding that DMCA claims need not be based on core 
rights granted in the Copyright Act, it nevertheless joins a 
nationwide trend in looking to the realities of a purported license 
transaction in order to limit the untrammeled ability of a 
corporation to assert control over aftermarket consumer behavior 
through threat of copyright infringement.  What remains to be 
seen is whether the decision will act as a catalyst to bridge some of 
the doctrinal gaps between circuits and thus accelerate the trend 
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